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“Judicial Hyperactivity” in the Federal
Circuit: An Empirical Study
By TED L. FIELD*

Introduction

COMMENTATORS HAVE ACCUSED the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Federal Circuit1 of “judicial hyperactivity”2 in patent
cases. William C. Rooklidge and Matthew F. Weil coined the term “judicial hyperactivity” when they observed that “the [Federal Circuit]
from time to time appears to lose track of the important distinction
between trial and appellate roles and engages in what might be
termed ‘judicial hyperactivity’—a form of decision-making at odds
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advice on statistical analysis. Finally, the author thanks colleagues who attended a
presentation of this Article at South Texas College of Law for their helpful suggestions.
The author welcomes comments via e-mail at tfield@stcl.edu.
1. Congress created the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 when it
enacted the Federal Court Improvements Act of 1982 (“FCIA”). Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96
Stat. 25, 25 (1982) (“An Act To establish a United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit . . . and for other purposes.”). The FCIA gave the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of patent decisions of the district courts. Id. at 37 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1) (2006)). The Federal Circuit also hears appeals from the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Id. at 38 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A)). Moreover, the FCIA granted the Federal Circuit with jurisdiction in other areas of law. Id. at 37–39 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295); see Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989)
(“[The FCIA] supplemented [the Federal Circuit’s] jurisdiction with adjudicatory authority in such diverse areas as trademark, tariff and customs law, technology transfer regulations, and government contract and labor disputes.” (footnotes omitted)); accord Charles
W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More Than a National Patent Court, 49
MO. L. REV. 43, 65–75 (1984) (describing the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction); Joseph R. Re,
Brief Overview of the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Under
§ 1295(a)(1), 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 651 (2002) (describing the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction).
2. William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal Circuit’s
Discomfort with Its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 726 (2000).
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with traditional notions of appellate review.”3 They argue that the Federal Circuit engages in judicial hyperactivity4 in patent cases by improperly acting as an advocate5 and as a fact-finder.6 Such judicial
hyperactivity “dramatically reduces certainty and predictability in patent appeals,”7 and litigants perceive the practice as unfair.8
Other commentators have criticized the Federal Circuit for engaging in judicial hyperactivity because of the court’s high reversal
rate for claim construction decisions in patent cases.9 Indeed, a number of empirical studies indicate that the Federal Circuit’s reversal
rate for claim construction decisions is high—ranging from 33% to as
high as 44%.10 The court decided long ago to review claim construction decisions with no deference to the district court’s decision or reasoning.11 Commentators have argued that the reversal rate is so high
because of this lack of deference.12 Thus, they claim that the Federal
Circuit is guilty of judicial hyperactivity by applying a de novo standard of review to this issue and reversing claim construction decisions
3. Id.
4. See infra Part I.A for a discussion of Rooklidge and Weil’s charges that the Federal
Circuit engages in judicial hyperactivity.
5. Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 2, at 735–39.
6. Id. at 739–48.
7. Id. at 751.
8. Id. at 745.
9. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 883 (2002) (“Ignoring conventional allocation-of-power principles that
give trial courts primary authority over factual questions, the Federal Circuit has asserted
power over fact. In the context of claim construction, it has done so simply by declaring
claim construction to be a pure question of law subject to de novo review.”); Rooklidge &
Weil, supra note 2, at 748 (“[B]y confirming that claim construction is an issue of law for
the court to decide, . . . Markman . . . plainly hastened the Federal Circuit’s move toward
greater involvement as an appellate tribunal in the sorts of de novo review that have
tempted the court to take on the role of advocate.”). See also infra notes 57–59 and accompanying text for a definition of claim construction.
10. See infra Table 1.
11. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
12. See Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1113 (2001) (linking the Federal Circuit’s high reversal rate with the de novo standard of review for claim construction decisions); Craig Allen
Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9 (2000) (“[D]e novo review
at the Federal Circuit level leads to dilatory certainty in claim meaning. . . . [And] it is
difficult to understand why, in the context of claim interpretation, de novo review is
needed to promote uniformity and certainty.”); Jeffrey Peabody, Under Construction: Towards a More Deferential Standard of Review in Claim Construction Cases, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 505,
520 (2008) (“Adopting a clearly erroneous standard would alleviate many . . . issues without
having to sacrifice uniformity and consistency in claim construction interpretation.”).
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at such a high rate.13 Indeed, the empirical studies revealing the Federal Circuit’s high reversal rate in claim construction decisions supports this notion.
A number of researchers have done empirical studies of the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in claim construction decisions.14 But this
author is unaware of any previous empirical research that examines
the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates and those of other circuits to help
determine whether the Federal Circuit engages in judicial hyperactivity, particularly in patent cases. This Article presents such a study. The
goal of this study was to determine whether the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate is significantly greater than that of other circuits of the
United States Court of Appeals. If the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates
are significantly greater than those of other circuits, then this fact
would tend to demonstrate that the Federal Circuit is a more judicially
hyperactive court than other circuits. And if the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in patent cases are significantly greater than those of other
circuits, then this fact would tend to demonstrate that the Federal Circuit is judicially hyperactive in patent cases. The results of this study
tend to show that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates are indeed
greater than those of the other circuits studied—both for patent cases
and non-patent cases combined, as well as patent cases individually—
thus supporting the hypothesis that the Federal Circuit in patent cases
is more judicially hyperactive than other circuits.
This study had two parts. The first part focused on contrasting
overall reversal rates and reversal rates for particular standards of review between the Federal Circuit and the several representative re13. See Rai, supra note 9, at 883 (“In the context of claim construction, . . . [the Federal Circuit has asserted power over fact] by simply declaring claim constructions to be a
pure question of law subject to the de novo review.”); Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 2, at
748 (“In the first year or so after the Markham decision, it appeared that the Federal Circuit
was reversing and remanding to the lower courts over a third of the claim constructions it
reviewed [de novo].”); John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The
Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183, 209–10
(1999) (“Seeking to expand its ability to regulate patent infringement disputes, the Federal
Circuit sought an interpretive strategy that would provide it with unrestrained powers of
review.”).
14. See, e.g., Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation:
The Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175
(2001); Chu, supra note 12; Kimberly Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve
Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Moore, District Court Judges];
Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2005) [hereinafter Moore, Markman Eight Years Later]; Andrew
T. Zidel, Comment, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study Showing the Need for
Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 711 (2003).
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gional circuits, as well as looking at the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates
in patent versus non-patent cases.15 The second part focused on contrasting reversal rates of the Federal Circuit with reversal rates of the
representative regional circuits, this time controlling for several examples of procedural postures.16 The results of the first part of the study
tend to support the hypothesis that the Federal Circuit engages in judicial hyperactivity, particularly in patent cases.17
Figure 1 below summarizes some of these results.

Figure 1: Contrast of Reversal Rates of Federal Circuits with
Reversal Rates of Sample Regional Circuits

As Figure 1 above shows, the overall reversal rate of the Federal Circuit in all cases was statistically significantly greater than the overall
reversal rates of the representative regional circuits treated as an aggregate.18 Additionally, when drilling down to the level of particular
standards of review, unadjusted reversal rates of the Federal Circuit
for all standards of review were statistically significantly greater than
the corresponding reversal rates of the representative regional cir-

15. See infra Part II.A for a detailed description of the methodology used in this part
of the study.
16. See infra Part II.B for a detailed description of the methodology used in this part
of the study.
17. See infra Part III.A for a detailed description of the results of this part of the study.
18. See infra Part III.A.3.a for a detailed description of the results of this part of the
study.
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cuits. Moreover, reversal rates adjusted for summary affirmances19 of
the Federal Circuit were also statistically significantly greater than the
corresponding reversal rates of the representative regional circuits
treated as an aggregate for all but one standard of review. These results tend to confirm empirically that the Federal Circuit is more judicially hyperactive than other circuits.
Moreover, as Figure 2 below shows, the Federal Circuit’s reversal
rates in patent cases were statistically significantly greater than in nonpatent cases, with one exception.20

Figure 2: Contrast of Federal Circuit’s Reversal Rates in
Patent with Non-Patent Cases

These results also show that the Federal Circuit is more judicially hyperactive in patent cases than in non-patent cases.
Moreover, as Figure 3 and Figure 4 below show, the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in patent cases were significantly greater than the
19. A summary affirmance is a procedural device that the Federal Circuit uses in certain cases in which it affirms the lower court’s decision without any opinion or explanation.
Beth Zeitlin Shaw, Note, Please Ignore This Case: An Empirical Study of Nonprecedential Opinions
in the Federal Circuit, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013, 1015 (2004); see also Christopher A.
Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 925 n.71 (2007) (citing Shaw, supra, at 1015); Moore, Markman
Eight Years Later, supra note 14, at 234 (“[Summary affirmance] is an affirmance of the
district court without opinion.”). See infra Part III.A.2 for a detailed discussion of summary
affirmances and the need to adjust the data for summary affirmances.
20. See infra Part III.A.3.b for a detailed description of the results of this part of the
study.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-3\SAN304.txt

726

unknown

Seq: 6

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

16-MAY-12

11:30

[Vol. 46

regional circuits’ reversal rates, but the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates
in non-patent cases were not significantly greater (with one exception) than the regional circuits’ reversal rates.21

Figure 3: Contrast of Reversal Rates of Non-Federal Circuits
with Reversal Rates of Federal Circuit in Patent Cases

These results indicate that in patent cases, the Federal Circuit is
more judicially hyperactive than the regional circuits, but in non-patent cases, the Federal Circuit does not exhibit more judicial hyperactivity than the regional circuits. Therefore, the results of the first part
of this study overall demonstrate that the Federal Circuit is more judicially hyperactive in patent cases than in non-patent cases and with
respect to the representative regional circuits.
The second part of the study focused on contrasting reversal rates
of the Federal Circuit with reversal rates of the representative regional
circuits, this time controlling for several examples of procedural postures.22 This part of the study examined 395 summary judgment cases
from 2005 and 321 judgments as a matter of law (“JMOL”) cases from
2007.
The results of this second part of the study also support the hypothesis that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate is higher than that of
21. See infra Part III.A.3.c for a detailed description of the results of this part of the
study.
22. See infra Part II.B for a detailed description of the methodology used in this part
of the study.
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Figure 4: Contrast of Reversal Rates of Non-Federal Circuits
with Reversal Rates of Federal Circuit in Non-Patent Cases

the regional circuits.23 Indeed, for all three examples of procedural
postures studied—summary judgment, JMOL, and preliminary injunction—the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate was statistically significantly
greater than that of the representative regional circuits taken as an
aggregate. These results empirically confirm that the Federal Circuit
has engaged in a greater degree of judicial hyperactivity than the representative regional circuits studied.
This Article describes this empirical study in detail. Part I begins
by discussing how commentators and others have charged the Federal
Circuit with engaging in judicial hyperactivity. Part II describes the
methodology used in carrying out the empirical study. Part III details
the results of the study. Finally, Part IV discusses possible reasons for
these results.

I.

Accusations that the Federal Circuit Has Engaged in
Judicial Hyperactivity

This Part describes how a number of commentators have criticized the Federal Circuit for engaging in judicial hyperactivity. First,
Part I.A discusses William C. Rooklidge and Matthew F. Weil’s argument that the Federal Circuit engages in judicial hyperactivity by im23. See infra Part III.B for a detailed description of the results of this second part of
the study.
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properly acting as an advocate and as a fact finder. Second, Part I.B
explains how commentators have accused the Federal Circuit of engaging in judicial hyperactivity because of its high reversal rate in
claim construction decisions.
A. Rooklidge and Weil: The Federal Circuit as Advocate and Fact
Finder
In an essay from 2000, two practitioners, William C. Rooklidge
and Matthew F. Weil, persuasively argued that the Federal Circuit engages in what they call “judicial hyperactivity.”24 According to Rooklidge and Weil, judicial hyperactivity is where an appellate court steps
out of its proper role as an appellate court and instead makes decisions that a lower court should properly make.25 They contrast judicial
hyperactivity with the traditional concept of judicial activism, which
they say “refers to a tribunal going beyond the substantive statutory or
common law to reach ideologically-motivated outcomes.”26 Rooklidge
and Weil note that judicial hyperactivity is unlike traditional judicial
activism because traditional judicial activism normally “is drenched in
political overtones.”27 Although they do not argue that the Federal
Circuit has engaged in ideologically or politically motivated judicial
activism, the authors point to several ways in which the Federal Circuit
has engaged in judicial hyperactivity.28 Rooklidge and Weil explain
that:
Almost since its inception, the Federal Circuit has been dogged
with criticism for straying from the path carefully delineated for
appellate tribunals. Disappointed litigants and commentators alike
have criticized the court for fact-finding and other forms of hyperactive judging. Increasingly, the bar is expressing concern over the
court’s decision-making procedures and its apparent willingness to
take over the roles of patent examiner, advocate and trier of fact.29

In other words, Rooklidge and Weil accuse the Federal Circuit of engaging in judicial hyperactivity by acting as both an advocate30 and a
fact-finder.31
24. Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 2, at 725–52.
25. Id. at 726–27.
26. Id. at 726.
27. Id. As an example of traditional judicial activism, Rooklidge and Weil point to the
time when the conservative majority of the U.S. Supreme Court struck down “liberal New
Deal legislation in the 1930s.” Id.
28. See id. at 735–48 (explaining instances in which the Federal Circuit has engaged in
advocacy and fact-finding).
29. Id. at 729–30 (footnotes omitted).
30. Id. at 735–39.
31. Id. at 739–48.
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1. The Federal Circuit as an Advocate
Rooklidge and Weil argue that the Federal Circuit has engaged in
judicial hyperactivity by improperly acting as an advocate in two ways:
(1) ignoring the general rule that appellate courts should not normally consider arguments the parties raise for the first time on appeal;
and (2) deciding issues that the parties failed to properly preserve in
the district court.32 They cite as an example a case involving a claim
limitation seemingly written in means-plus-function format.33 In that
case, the district court and both parties all agreed that the limitation
was in that format.34 However, the Federal Circuit sua sponte reversed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the grounds that
the district court erred in construing the limitation as a means-plusfunction limitation.35 Rooklidge and Weil argue that the Federal Circuit acted as an advocate by “revers[ing] the district court on an issue
that no one raised on appeal.”36 The Federal Circuit based its decision
32. Id. at 735–36. Rooklidge and Weil quote the Federal Circuit’s articulation of the
reasons for the rule that appellate courts should not consider arguments raised for the first
time on appeal:
A party’s argument should not be a moving target. The argument at the trial and
appellate level should be consistent, thereby ensuring a clear presentation of the
issue to be resolved, an adequate opportunity for response and evidentiary development by the opposing party, and a record reviewable by the appellate court
that is properly crystallized around and responsive to the asserted argument.
Id. at 735 (quoting Finnigan Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 180 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
1999)). Similarly, Rooklidge and Weil quote the Federal Circuit’s articulation of the reasons for the rule that appellate courts should normally not consider arguments that the
parties have failed to preserve in the district court: “Application of this rule ‘frees trial
courts to focus on the factual and legal issues the parties identify as being in dispute, without having to worry that a misstep on an issue not disputed or objected to by the parties
will result in a reversal.’” Id. at 735–36 (quoting Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court
Constr., 172 F.3d 836, 852 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Bryson & Newman, JJ., concurring)).
33. Id. at 736–37 (citing Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir.
1999)). A means-plus-function limitation is a claim limitation—authorized under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, para. 6 (2006)—that recites a function performed by an element of the invention
rather than the structure of the element of the invention. JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW
87 (3d ed. 2009). Determining whether an accused device infringes a means-plus-function
limitation involves different rules than those applicable for an ordinary structural limitation. See id. at 88–90 (explaining the rule applicable to means-plus-function limitations).
Thus, a court should decide whether a limitation is in means-plus-function format as a
threshold matter.
34. See Rodime, 174 F.3d at 1300–03 (narrating the procedural history of the case); see
also Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 2, at 736 (“[In Rodime,] neither the patentee nor the
accused infringer argued to the Federal Circuit that the subject limitation was anything
other than a means plus function limitation.”).
35. Rodime, 174 F.3d at 1303.
36. Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 2, at 736.
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on “its responsibility to interpret the claims as a matter of law.”37 But
Rooklidge and Weil indicate that in similar cases, the Federal Circuit
declined to construe claims sua sponte whose interpretations the parties did not dispute.38 They conclude that this sort of judicial hyperactivity produces uncertainty among practitioners: “Now the bar is left to
wonder why and when the court will consider arguments raised for
the first time on appeal and arguments not made by either party but
concocted by the court itself.”39
2. The Federal Circuit as a Fact-Finder
Rooklidge and Weil also argue that the Federal Circuit has overstepped its proper appellate role and engaged in judicial hyperactivity
by acting as a fact-finder.40 They point out the potential problems with
this type of judicial hyperactivity:
As an appellate court, the Federal Circuit’s role is not to hear evidence de novo. Fairness to the litigants weighs against reconsideration of the facts at the appellate level. Appellate fact-finding would
undermine the lower tribunal’s legitimacy, increase the number of
appeals by encouraging litigants to retry cases at the appellate
level, and needlessly reallocate judicial authority.41

Two ways in which Rooklidge and Weil identify that the Federal
Circuit has acted as a fact-finder are (1) by finding facts instead of
remanding after reversing a district court’s judgment; and (2) after
reversing a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party, by granting summary judgment in favor of the other party, even in the absence of a cross-motion for summary judgment.42
With respect to fact-finding instead of remanding, Rooklidge and
Weil note that the Federal Circuit justifies this practice by reasoning
37. Rodime, 174 F.3d at 1302.
38. Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 2, at 738 (“In another pre-Rodime opinion, this one
per curiam, the court noted that ‘where, as here, the parties agree to a particular construction of the claims which is adopted by the district court, and neither party disputes that
construction on appeal, this court declines to raise an issue sua sponte which the parties
have not presented on appeal.’” (quoting Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr.,
172 F.3d 836, 842 (Fed. Cir 1999) (per curiam))); id. (“[I]n a similar case that post-dated
Rodime, the court noted its concern with the claim construction but stated that ‘where, as
here, the parties agree to a claim construction that is adopted by the district court, and
neither party disputes that construction on appeal, we decline to raise an issue sua sponte
that the parties have not presented.’” (quoting WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184
F.3d 1339, 1348 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
39. Id. at 738–39.
40. Id. at 739–48.
41. Id. at 739 (footnotes omitted).
42. Id. at 740, 743.
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that “the court could only make one finding of fact or decide the fact
in only one way.”43 They claim that the Federal Circuit sometimes
finds facts instead of remands, even in cases where “the evidence is
disputed.”44 They further caution that even in cases where the facts
seem simple and easy to resolve, such appellate fact finding is inappropriate because a fact-finder could nonetheless decide such facts in
more than one way.45
With respect to granting summary judgment to one party after
reversing a grant of summary judgment in favor of the other party
even in the absence of cross-motions for summary judgment, Rooklidge and Weil gave an example of a case where the Federal Circuit
reviewed a district court’s grant of summary judgment of literal infringement in favor of the patentee.46 The Federal Circuit held that
there was no literal infringement and then went on to consider infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, even though the district court had not reached this issue.47 According to the court, the
record evidence did not support infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents as a matter of law.48 But instead of merely reversing the
grant of summary judgment in favor of the patentee, the Federal Circuit ordered the district court to enter summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of the accused infringer49—even though “the
accused infringer had never even moved for summary judgment of

43. Id. at 742 (quoting SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d
878, 886 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Id. at 741–42 (citing SmithKline, 859 F.2d at 886 n.4).
45. Id. at 742.
46. Id. at 743 (citing Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc.,
145 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
47. Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1310–11; see also Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 2, at 743
(citing Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1310–11 (“The Federal Circuit . . . disagree[d] with the
district court on literal infringement and was willing to consider the doctrine of
equivalents even though the district court had not reached it . . . .”). Literal infringement
occurs “where the accused subject matter falls precisely within the boundaries of the
claim.” MUELLER, supra note 33, at 349. Even where an accused invention does not literally
infringe a patent claim, infringement under the doctrine of equivalents may nonetheless
exist. Id. at 351. The doctrine of equivalents allows “a patent [to] protect[ ] its holder
against efforts of copyists to evade liability for infringement by making only insubstantial
changes to a patented invention.” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
535 U.S. 722, 727 (2002).
48. Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1311; see also Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 2, at 743–44
(“[T]he [Chiuminatta] court did not agree that the evidence on summary judgment
showed infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.”).
49. Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1313.
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noninfringement.”50 Rooklidge and Weil warn that parties will perceive this practice “as at least unfair and possibly as a denial of due
process.”51 They also caution that this practice “will spur disappointed
nonmovants to appeal, seeking the grant of a summary judgment for
which they never asked.”52 Finally, they predict that “[a]s a result, appeals will increase while confidence in the court decreases.”53
Ultimately, Rooklidge and Weil claim that this judicial
hyperactivity:
[D]ramatically reduces certainty and predictability in patent appeals. This in turn will cause the number of appeals to continue to
increase as disappointed litigants are encouraged to roll the dice in
hope that the Federal Circuit will . . . think up some new arguments that had not occurred to counsel, or find facts not found by
the lower tribunal.54

They conclude that “the Federal Circuit, like any other appellate
court, should strive to confine its decision-making procedures to those
traditionally associated with an appellate court, and leave . . . innovative advocacy and fact-finding to others.”55
B. Claim Construction
In particular, commentators have accused the Federal Circuit of
engaging in judicial hyperactivity because of the high reversal rate in
its decisions involving claim construction.56 Claim construction is the
50. Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 2, at 744. Rooklidge and Weil note that the Federal
Circuit supported its sua sponte grant of summary judgment with a Ninth Circuit case. Id.
But they argue the Federal Circuit misapplied this authority and “grossly mischaracterized
Ninth Circuit law” in two ways. Id. First, this case did not hold that an appellate court may
sua sponte grant summary judgment because the Ninth Circuit was reviewing a trial court
decision, not an appellate court ruling. Id. Second, the Ninth Circuit requires the nonmoving party, against which the court might sua sponte grant summary judgment, to be “given
reasonable notice that the sufficiency of his or her claim will be in issue,” and only when
such notice is given may the court sua sponte grant summary judgment. Id. (quoting
O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rooklidge and Weil claim that the Federal Circuit exceeded its authority because, as
an appellate court, it is not in position to give the party such notice. Id. at 744–45.
51. Id. at 745.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 751–52 (footnotes omitted).
55. Id. at 752.
56. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 14, at 207–08 (“[O]n appeal, the Federal Circuit
changes the claim construction in approximately 40% of the cases. Obviously, this situation
offers no certainty or predictability.” (footnote omitted)); Moore, District Court Judges, supra
note 14, at 27 (“The high reversal rate on claim construction is problematic. It creates
uncertainty in patent cases and in patent claim scope analysis until the Federal Circuit
review is complete.”).
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necessary first step in any determination of patent infringement.57
When construing patent claims,58 a judge “interpret[s] the specific
terms or phrases used by the patentee to define the technology covered by the patent.”59 Commentators have accused the Federal Circuit
of overstepping its proper appellate role by reviewing claim construction decisions de novo instead of giving deference to the claim construction decisions of the district courts.60 District court judges have
also criticized the Federal Circuit’s high reversal rate on claim construction decisions.61 Even certain judges of the Federal Circuit themselves have similarly criticized the court’s application of the de novo
standard to claim construction decisions.62
57. E.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (“An infringement analysis involves two steps. First the court determines the scope
and meaning of the patent claims asserted, and then the properly construed claims are
compared to the allegedly infringing device.” (citations omitted)).
58. A patent claim is “arguably the most important part of a patent. [It] is a precisiondrafted, single-sentence definition of the patent owner’s right to exclude others.” MUELLER, supra note 33, at 65. The Patent Act requires that the specification of every patent
must “conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming
the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
59. David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 225 (2008).
60. See supra notes 9, 12–13; see, e.g., Thomas Chen, Note, Patent Claim Construction: An
Appeal for Chevron Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1180 (2008) (“[A]ppellate review of claim
construction would greatly benefit from a more deferential approach that simply assesses
whether the district court derived a reasonable claim interpretation, in place of the currently inefficient pursuit of a single best answer.”).
61. See, e.g., Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 14, at 11 (“[The Federal Circuit
has] reversed everything I’ve ever done, so I expect fully they’ll reverse this, too.” (quoting
O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., No. 95-CV-113 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 1996) (statement of Samuel B.
Kent, J.)); Panel Discussion, High Technology Law in the Twenty-First Century, 21 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 13, 19 (1997) (statement of William G. Young, J.) (“I have had nine of
my cases appealed to the Federal Circuit. I have been affirmed in one. I have been affirmed in part in one. And I have been reversed in seven.” (footnote omitted)).
62. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (Michel, C.J., dissenting) (“Rehearing this case en banc would have enabled us
to reconsider [the] rule of de novo review for claim construction in light of our eight years
of experience with its application. I have come to believe that reconsideration is appropriate and revision may be advisable.”); id. at 1044 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“I urge this court to
accord deference to the factual components of the lower court’s claim construction.”); id.
at 1046 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“I believe this court should have taken this case en banc to
reconsider its position on deference to district court claim construction . . . .”); Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (“Now
more than ever I am convinced of the futility, indeed the absurdity, of this court’s persistence in adhering to the falsehood that claim construction is a matter of law devoid of any
factual component.”); Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1478 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part) (“By according some deference where appropriate, this court can restore the trial court’s prominence in the claim interpretation function and bring again
more certainty at an earlier stage of the judicial process.”); id. at 1480 (Newman, J., addi-
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Although the Supreme Court has characterized claim construction as a “mongrel practice” combining both issues of law and fact,63
in the en banc decision of Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,64 the
Federal Circuit decided that it would treat claim construction decisions as pure questions of law subject to review without deference to
the district court.65 Relying on its earlier decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,66 the court reasoned that claim construction is a
pure question of law because it truly involves “construction of [a] written document.”67 This construction must be “based upon the patent
and prosecution history.”68 Although the district court may consider
extrinsic evidence in helping it construe the claims, the Federal Circuit reasoned that “the [district] court is not crediting certain evidence over other evidence or making factual evidentiary findings.”69
Thus, the Federal Circuit held that claim construction is a pure question of law subject to de novo review on appeal.70
Since Markman and Cybor Corp., several researchers have undertaken empirical studies of the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate in its
claim construction decisions.71 These commentators have found that
the reversal rate in such decisions is seemingly quite high. Table 1
below summarizes the results of these previous studies.

tional views) (“The court today . . . rejects the opportunity to give normal appellate deference to the proceedings and findings of trial . . . .”); Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc. (Markman I), 52 F.3d 967, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting),
aff’d 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (“Commentators have remarked on the temptation of appellate
courts to redefine questions of fact as questions of law in order to impose the court’s policy
viewpoint on the decision.”).
63. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 378, 388
(1996).
64. 138 F.3d 1448.
65. Id. at 1456.
66. Markman I, 52 F.3d at 981.
67. Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1454 (quoting Markman I, 52 F.3d at 981).
68. Id. (quoting Markman I, 52 F.3d at 981). “The prosecution history . . . consists of
the complete record of the proceedings [for a particular patent application] before the
[Patent and Trademark Office] . . . .” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.
69. Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1454 (quoting Markman I, 52 F.3d at 981).
70. Id. at 1456.
71. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 14; Chu, supra note 12; Moore, District Court Judges,
supra note 14; Moore, Markman Eight Years Later, supra note 14; Zidel, supra note 14.

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-3\SAN304.txt

Winter 2012]

unknown

Seq: 15

16-MAY-12

JUDICIAL HYPERACTIVITY

11:30

735

Table 1: Claim Construction Reversal Rates from Previous
Empirical Studies
Author

Year of Study

Reversal Rate

Chu

2001

44.0%72

Bender

2001

40.0%73

Moore

2001

33.0%74

Zidel

2003

41.5%75

Moore

2004

37.5%76

In 2001, in a comprehensive study of claim construction reversal
rates, Christian A. Chu “conducted an empirical study that systematically examined [then-]recent Federal Circuit decisions and applied
statistical methods to analyze trends in the [Federal Circuit’s] claim
construction jurisprudence.”77 He studied all patent decisions of the
Federal Circuit from January 1, 1998, through April 30, 2000.78 In his
study, Mr. Chu found that the Federal Circuit modified claim construction in 44% of the cases he examined that expressly involved a
review of claim construction.79 He concluded that the Federal Circuit’s de novo standard of review of claim construction could explain
this high reversal rate.80
Also in 2001, Gretchen Ann Bender examined the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate in claim construction decisions.81 She considered
all of the court’s cases in which it reviewed claim construction from
the time of the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman in 1996.82 She
found that the Federal Circuit had altered the district court’s claim
construction in around 40% of the cases she examined.83 Ms. Bender
argued that this high reversal rate was a result of several factors, in72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Chu, supra note 12, at 1104.
Bender, supra note 14, at 207.
Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 14, at 11–12.
Zidel, supra note 14, at 747.
Moore, Markman Eight Years Later, supra note 14, at 239.
Chu, supra note 12, at 1075.
Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1104.
Id. at 1143.
Bender, supra note 14, at 202–07.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 207.
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cluding the inherent ambiguity in claim language and flaws with the
Federal Circuit’s claim construction methodology.84
Also in 2001, then-Professor Kimberly A. Moore did an empirical
study of the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate with respect to claim construction.85 Similar to Ms. Bender’s study, in Professor Moore’s study,
she examined all cases beginning in 1996, just after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Markman, through 2000.86 But unlike the studies
of Mr. Chu and Ms. Bender, Professor Moore’s study included cases
that were summarily affirmed without opinion under Federal Circuit
Rule 36.87 According to Professor Moore, by omitting Rule 36 summary affirmances, Mr. Chu’s and Ms. Bender’s reversal rates were artificially high.88 Instead, Professor Moore’s study revealed that the
reversal rate in claim construction decisions from 1996 to 2000 was
only 33%.89 Although this result is substantially lower than the results
obtained by Mr. Chu (44%)90 and Ms. Bender (40%),91 a reversal rate
of 33% is nonetheless quite high.92
In 2003, Andrew T. Zidel also considered the Federal Circuit’s
claim construction reversal rate.93 He examined all Federal Circuit
cases in 2001 that expressly involved claim construction.94 But like Mr.
Chu and Ms. Bender, Mr. Zidel did not include Rule 36 summary affirmances in his study.95 Thus, Mr. Zidel’s results were similarly artificially high.96 He found that the Federal Circuit reversed the district
court’s claim construction in 41.5% of the cases he examined,97 which
is in line with the results of Mr. Chu’s (44%)98 and Ms. Bender’s
(40%)99 similar studies. Mr. Zidel concluded that this high reversal
84. Id. at 209–17.
85. Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 14, at 2.
86. Id. at 8–9.
87. Id. at 8; FED. CIR. R. 36. See infra Part III.A.2 for a detailed discussion of this rule
and summary affirmances.
88. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later, supra note 14, at 235–36, 235 n.15.
89. Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 14, at 11–12.
90. Chu, supra note 12, at 1104.
91. Bender, supra note 14, at 207.
92. See Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 14, at 16–17 (“As this empirical evidence
shows, the 33% reversal rate for claim construction is higher than the reversal rate for
other issues.”).
93. Zidel, supra note 14, at 744–48.
94. Id. at 744.
95. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later, supra note 14, at 235–36. See infra Part III.A.2
for a detailed discussion of Rule 36 and summary affirmances.
96. Id. at 236.
97. Zidel, supra note 14, at 747.
98. Chu, supra note 12, at 1104.
99. Bender, supra note 14, at 207.
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rate was a result of a number of specific errors that district courts
made in applying the Federal Circuit’s articulated claim construction
methodology.100
In 2004, then-Professor Moore did a second empirical study of
the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in claim construction decisions.101
In this second study, Professor Moore updated her 2001 study by including cases from 1996 through 2003.102 As with her 2001 study, she
included cases that were summarily affirmed without an opinion
under Federal Circuit Rule 36.103 According to this study, the Federal
Circuit held that the district court incorrectly construed at least one
claim term in 37.5% of all cases.104 In other words, “the reversal rate
[was] getting worse not better.”105 Professor Moore reasoned that this
high reversal rate, trending upward, could be a result of several
things, including (1) the Federal Circuit’s de novo standard of review
for claim construction decisions; (2) the lack of technical training possessed by district court judges; and (3) the lack of “repeat exposure to
claim construction” by district court judges.106
Regardless of the precise cause, all these empirical studies show
that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate in claim construction decisions
is quite high. Thus, these studies support the idea that the Federal
Circuit has engaged in judicial hyperactivity.

II.

Methodology of the Empirical Study

This empirical study involved comparing the reversal rates of the
Federal Circuit with corresponding reversal rates of other circuit
courts of appeal. The goal of this study was to determine whether the
Federal Circuit’s reversal rate is significantly greater than that of the
other circuits studied, particularly in patent cases. If the Federal Cir100. See Zidel, supra note 14, at 748–53. The specific errors that Mr. Zidel identified
include improperly importing claim limitations from the patent specification into the
claims, improperly construing claims without considering how one of ordinary skill in the
art would interpret the claim language, relying on inappropriate dictionary definitions,
and improperly construing complex means-plus-function limitations. Id.
101. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later, supra note 14, at 239–45.
102. Id. at 239.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 239.
105. Id. at 245 (capitalization omitted).
106. Id. at 245–46. But an empirical study by Professor David L. Schwartz refutes the
notion that the lack of experience that district court judges have at construing claims is
responsible for the Federal Circuit’s high reversal rate of claim construction decisions.
Schwartz, supra note 59, at 267 (“[T]he reversal rate may be essentially constant, regardless
of the prior claim construction experience of the district court judge.”).
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cuit’s reversal rate in patent cases is significantly greater than other
circuits, then this fact would demonstrate empirically that the Federal
Circuit is a more judicially hyperactive court than other circuits.
The study contrasted reversal rates of the Federal Circuit with reversal rates of several representative regional circuit courts of appeal.
The regional circuits studied were the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits. These circuits were chosen because they are among
the largest circuits in terms of caseload,107 and they include some of
the most populous states.108
This study had two parts. The first part of the study focused on
contrasting overall reversal rates and reversal rates for particular standards of review between the Federal Circuit—in all cases, patent cases
only, and non-patent cases only—and the several representative regional circuits. The second part of the study focused on contrasting
reversal rates of the Federal Circuit with reversal rates of the representative regional circuits, this time controlling for several examples of
procedural postures. The remainder of this Part describes the methodology used in the two parts of this empirical study. Part II.A discusses the methodology used in the first part of the study, and Part
II.B discusses the methodology used in the second part of the study.
A. Methodology for Examining Overall Reversal Rates and
Reversal Rates for Particular Standards of Review
The first part of the study examined differences between the
overall reversal rates of the Federal Circuit in patent and non-patent
cases and the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, as well as the
reversal rates for particular standards of review. This part of the study
contrasted reversal rates for discrete issues, rather than on a case-bycase basis.
The first step was gathering the necessary data. The data gathered
included 2457 different issues in 2076 different cases.109 For each of
107. The Ninth, Second, and Fifth Circuits had the first, second, and third most cases
pending as of March 31, 2009. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS 24 tbl.B-1 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2009/tables/B01Mar09.pdf [hereinafter Table B1] (showing pending cases for all U.S. Courts of Appeals).
108. The Second Circuit includes New York; the Fifth Circuit includes Texas; the Seventh Circuit includes Illinois; and the Ninth Circuit includes California. U.S. Judiciary: The
Federal Court System and Decisions, LIBR. CONG., http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/federal/usjudic.php#appeals (last visited Mar. 13, 2012).
109. For the regional circuits studied, the cases included in this part of the study are
the first 1772 cases of 2010. This time period ran from January 2010 through February
2010. For the Federal Circuit, the cases included are the first 304 cases of 2010. This time
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these issues, it was determined whether the court of appeals affirmed,
reversed, vacated, or affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower
court on that particular issue. Each major issue was examined separately. Where a case discussed multiple “minor” issues, these minor
issues were grouped together as one major issue. For example, in a
case involving multiple related evidentiary rulings, these rulings were
not treated as individual issues reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard; instead, they were grouped together as one issue reviewed
under this standard. If the court affirmed or reversed all the rulings,
then the issue was recorded as “affirmed” or “reversed,” respectively; if
the court affirmed some and reversed some of the rulings, then the
issue was recorded as “affirmed in part-reversed in part.”110
Certain types of dispositions were excluded from the data. For
example, the database does not include decisions granting or denying
motions made to the court of appeals,111 resolving petitions to appeal,112 and deciding petitions for writs of mandamus.113 Also excluded were any issues for which the court did not articulate a
standard of review.114
period ran from January 2010 through June 2010. These cases were retrieved using either
Westlaw or Lexis.
These time periods limit this study. Even though the total number of regional-circuit
cases and issues examined was large, this study would have been improved had it been
possible to examine cases of the regional circuits for a greater time period to be sure that
the results apply to more than just the relatively short time period studied.
Moreover, the time period for the Federal Circuit cases studied extends farther than
the time period for the regional circuits studied. The results would be improved if both
time periods matched. This asymmetry was necessary to ensure that an adequate sample
size of Federal Circuit cases was obtained. Thus, this study relies on the seemingly reasonable assumption that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates during the period from March
through June 2010 did not change significantly from the period running from January
through February 2010.
110. This information was entered into a Microsoft Access database and later transferred to a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to analyze the data. The database included the
following fields: citation, circuit, year, and fields for tracking up to nine discrete issues per
case. The fields for tracking the discrete issues included a pair of fields for each issue—(1)
standard of review and (2) corresponding disposition. The standard of review fields were
relationally linked to a lookup table comprising the different standards of review studied,
and the disposition fields were relationally linked to a lookup table comprising possible
dispositions.
111. For example, Young v. Shinseki, 364 F. App’x 634 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (granting plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily withdraw his appeal), was not included.
112. For example, Harrison v. Shinseki, 364 F. App’x 630 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (dismissing
appeal of decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans’ Claims), was not included.
113. For example, In re Pfizer, Inc., 364 F. App’x 620 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (denying petition
for writ of mandamus), was not included.
114. For example, no issue was recorded if a court said that the appellant’s additional
arguments were without merit.
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Data were tabulated for the reversal rates for each standard of
review for each of the circuits studied. The data from the representative regional circuits were combined into “overall non-Federal Circuit”
totals to allow for the easy contrast of Federal Circuit reversal rates
with the reversal rates from the representative regional circuits taken
as a whole. Further, the Federal Circuit data were adjusted for the
Federal Circuit’s use of summary affirmances.115 Appendix A contains
data tables that show the raw data obtained for this part of the study.
B. Methodology for Contrasting Reversal Rates, Controlling for
Several Examples of Procedural Postures
The second part of the study focused on contrasting reversal rates
of the Federal Circuit with reversal rates of the representative regional
circuits, this time controlling for several examples of procedural postures. The procedural postures examined included grants and denials
of (1) summary judgment; (2) JMOL;116 and (3) preliminary injunctions. These procedural postures involve both deferential and nondeferential standards of review,117 which allowed the study to determine whether different procedural postures having both deferential
and non-deferential standards of review have any effect on the Federal
Circuit’s reversal rate compared to that of other circuits.
First, relevant cases were obtained for the Federal Circuit and
each representative regional circuit for each of the procedural pos115. See infra Part III.A.2 for a discussion of how the data were adjusted to take summary affirmances into account.
116. The study included both pre-verdict motions for JMOL (i.e., directed verdicts)
and post-verdict motions for JMOL (i.e., judgments notwithstanding the verdict).
117. Grants of summary judgment motions and grants and denials of motions for judgment as a matter of law are reviewed de novo—i.e., with no deference to the lower court’s
judgment. E.g., Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Transam. Life Ins. Co., 609 F.3d 1364, 1368,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing district court’s denial of JMOL); Sundance, Inc. v.
DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reversing district
court’s grant of JMOL); Conroy v. Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 14 F.3d 1570, 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (vacating district court’s grant of summary judgment). Denials of summary judgment motions and grants and denials of preliminary injunction motions are reviewed for
abuse of discretion—i.e., with great deference to the lower court’s judgment. E.g., Trading
Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming district
court’s denial of summary judgment); Celsis In Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 664 F.3d
922, 925, 932 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s grant of preliminary injunction);
Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1298–99 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) (affirming
district court’s denial of preliminary injunction); Am. Signature, Inc. v. United States, 598
F.3d 816, 823, 870 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing Court of International Trade’s denial of
preliminary injunction).

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-3\SAN304.txt

Winter 2012]

unknown

Seq: 21

JUDICIAL HYPERACTIVITY

16-MAY-12

11:30

741

tures studied.118 Next, the cases were examined to eliminate false positives.119 After that, the cases were coded. Each case was studied, and it
was determined whether the court in that case reversed, vacated, or
affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s decision for
the particular procedural posture in question.120 Appendix B contains
data tables that show the raw data obtained for this part of the study.
C. Methodology for Determining Whether Differences in Reversal
Rates Were Statistically Significant
The same methodology was used in each of the two parts of this
study to determine whether particular differences in reversal rates
were statistically significant. In all instances, the null hypothesis121 was
that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate did not differ from that of the
representative regional circuits. The alternative hypothesis122 was that
the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate was greater than that of the representative regional circuits.
To determine whether differences in reversal rates were statistically significant such that the null hypothesis could be rejected, two118. Appropriate search terms were entered using the database on Westlaw or Lexis for
the circuit in question for the last several years. The study examined 395 summary judgment cases from 2005, 321 JMOL cases from 2007–2009, and 392 preliminary injunction
cases from 2005–2009.
119. For example, false positives occurred when searching for JMOL cases using the
phrase “judgment as a matter of law” as a search term. Such a search term was necessary to
identify JMOL cases, but it generated false positives wherever this term was mentioned in
summary judgment cases, as it often was. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 434 F.3d 357,
361 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Summary judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
120. This information was entered into Microsoft Access databases. If a particular case
included decisions on other procedural postures, these decisions were not included in the
database. A separate database was used for each procedural posture. Each of the databases
for each procedural posture studied included the following fields: case caption, citation,
circuit, year, and disposition. The summary judgment database also included fields to track
whether the motion was granted or denied at the district court and whether the plaintiff or
defendant was the moving party. The JMOL database also included fields to track whether
a district court granted or denied the motion and whether the case involved a pre- or postverdict motion for JMOL.
121. A null hypothesis is a hypothesis that a researcher will accept “unless the statistical
evidence is very strong in the other direction.” CHARLES LIVINGSTON & PAUL VOAKES, WORKING WITH NUMBERS AND STATISTICS 84 (2005).
122. An “[a]lternative [h]ypothesis is the opposite of the [n]ull [h]ypothesis.” Id. If the
statistical evidence is sufficiently strong to overcome the null hypothesis, then a researcher
will accept the alternative hypothesis as true. See D.G. REES, ESSENTIAL STATISTICS 141 (4th
ed. 2001) (“[I]f we reject the null hypothesis we should accept the alternative hypothesis
. . . .”).
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proportion z-values were calculated.123 These z-values were then converted to p-values using a standard conversion chart124 to determine
whether these differences in reversal rates were statistically significant
to particular confidence levels. In this context, a p-value gives the
probability that the difference between reversal rates was merely due
to chance and not the result of the operation of the alternative hypothesis125—that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate was greater than
that of the representative regional circuits. This study considered differences in reversal rates to be statistically significant for p-values less
than 0.1—i.e., where the confidence level that mere chance was not at
play was 90% or greater.

III.

Results of the Study: The Federal Circuit Engages in
Judicial Hyperactivity

The results of this empirical study indicate that the Federal Circuit engages in judicial hyperactivity. First, Part III.A discusses in detail
the results of the first part of this study, which examines overall reversal rates and reversal rates for particular standards of review, in both
patent and non-patent cases. Second, Part III.B discusses in detail the
123. The following formula for a two-proportion z-test was used to calculate z-values:

, e.g., DAVID S. MOORE, THE BASIC PRACTICE
506 (1995), where:

OF

STATISTICS

124. Basic Statistics: Mean, Median, Average, Standard Deviation, Z-Scores, and P-Value,
MICH. CHEM. PROCESS DYNAMICS & CONTROLS OPEN TEXT BOOK, https://controls.engin.
umich.edu/wiki/index.php/Basic_statistics:_mean,_median,_average,_standard_deviation,_z-scores,_and_p-value (last visited Jan. 16, 2012) (follow “Media:Group_G_Z-Table.xls” hyperlink). Note that this table actually gives values for 1 – p. See id. But these
values were easily converted to p-values by subtracting them from one. For example, if 1 – p
= 0.1, then p = 1 – 0.1 = 0.9.
125. For example, for p = 0.05, the probability that the difference between reversal
rates was merely due to chance is 5%. Thus, for this p-value, the difference is statistically
significant, and the confidence level is 95%.
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results of the second part of this study, which examines reversal rates
controlling for several examples of procedural postures.
A. Results: Overall Reversal Rates and Reversal Rates for
Particular Standards of Review
The results of this part of the study support the hypothesis that
the Federal Circuit engages in judicial hyperactivity. This Part discusses the results of this first part of the study in detail. First, Part
III.A.1 below concludes that the frequency the circuits used each standard of review may shed some, but not much, light on whether the
Federal Circuit is more judicially hyperactive than other circuits. Second, Part III.A.2 discusses adjusting data concerning the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates for that court’s use of summary affirmances. Third
and finally, Part III.A.3 examines (1) the differences between the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in all its cases—patent and non-patent—
and the regional circuits’ reversal rates; (2) the differences between
the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in patent cases and its reversal rates
in non-patent cases; and (3) the contrast between (a) the differences
between the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in patent cases and the
regional circuits’ reversal rates and (b) the differences between the
Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in non-patent cases and the regional
circuits’ reversal rates. These results all support the hypothesis that
the Federal Circuit is judicially hyperactive in patent cases.
1. Frequency of Each Standard of Review
As a preliminary matter, it might be possible to conclude that the
Federal Circuit is judicially hyperactive relative to the other circuits
studied by merely looking at the frequency of each standard of review
in each circuit. If the Federal Circuit reviewed a significantly greater
proportion of issues under the non-deferential de novo standard and
a significantly lesser proportion of issues under the more deferential
standards, that fact would tend to support a conclusion that the Federal Circuit is more hyperactive than the other circuits.
Table 2, Figure 5, and Figure 6 below show that the frequencies
of the standards of review within cases of the Federal Circuit are similar to the overall totals of the representative regional circuits for the
deferential clear error, substantial evidence and reasonable juror, and
abuse of discretion standards. Indeed, the differences between the fre-
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quencies of each of these standards of review between the Federal Circuit and the regional circuits overall are not statistically significant.126
Interestingly, though, the difference between the frequency of
the non-deferential de novo standard at the Federal Circuit and that
of the regional circuits is statistically significant.127 This data tends to
support that the Federal Circuit reviews a greater percentage of issues
using the least deferential standard of review than the regional circuits. Therefore, this result tends to empirically support the hypothesis that the Federal Circuit is more judicially hyperactive than the
example regional circuits studied.

Table 2: Frequency of Each Standard of Review by Circuit
Standard of
Review

Second
Circuit

Fifth
Circuit

Seventh
Circuit

De novo

37.8%

42.4%

38.8%

Clear error

7.7%

23.9%

24.0%

Substantial
evidence/
Reasonable
juror

29.3%

7.8%

13.8%

Abuse of
discretion

25.3%

25.9%

OVERALL

100.0%

100.0%

Ninth
Circuit

NON-FED
OVERALL

Federal
Circuit

43.0%

41.0%

47.9%

11.2%

14.1%

7.5%

18.1%

18.7%

15.8%

23.5%

27.6%

26.2%

28.8%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

2. Adjusting the Federal Circuit’s Reversal Rates for Summary
Affirmances
To avoid artificially high reversal rates, this study considered the
fact that the Federal Circuit often affirms decisions using summary
affirmances.128 Local Rule 36 of the Federal Circuit gives a panel the
power to summarily affirm a decision where “any of [five] conditions
exist and an opinion would have no precedential value.”129 Thus, a
126. For the clear error standard, even though the frequency for the regional circuits is
almost double that of the Federal Circuit, the difference is not statistically significant. For
this difference, z = 0.959 and p = 0.1949.
For the substantial evidence/reasonable juror standard, z = 0.529 and p = 0.2981.
Thus, this difference is also not statistically significant.
For the abuse of discretion standard, z = 0.550 and p = 0.2912. Thus, this difference is
also not statistically significant.
127. For the de novo standard, z = 1.677 and p = 0.0465. Thus, this difference is statistically significant to a 95.4% confidence level.
128. See supra note 19.
129. FED. CIR. R. 36. Federal Circuit Rule 36 reads as follows:
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Figure 6: Frequency of Each
Standard of Review—NonFederal Circuits Overall

Federal Circuit panel can issue a Rule 36 summary affirmance “where
it is not necessary to explain, even to the loser, why he lost.”130
This study took into account the existence of these summary affirmances to avoid an artificially high reversal rate. The number of summary affirmances the Federal Circuit issued during the period of this
study was 55 out of 416 total cases—i.e., in 13.2% of all cases.131 This
The court may enter a judgment of affirmance without opinion, citing this rule,
when it determines that any of the following conditions exist and an opinion
would have no precedential value:
(a) the judgment, decision, or order of the trial court appealed from is based
on findings that are not clearly erroneous;
(b) the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict is sufficient;
(c) the record supports summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment on
the pleadings;
(d) the decision of an administrative agency warrants affirmance under the
standard of review in the statute authorizing the petition for review; or
(e) a judgment or decision has been entered without an error of law.
Id.
130. The Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 128 F.R.D. 409, 420 (May 24, 1989) (remarks of Hon. Howard T. Markey, C.J.,
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
131. The number of summary affirmances during the period studied was determined
by two independent methods, the results of which agreed with each other. The first
method involved searching for “FED. CIR. R. 36” in the Westlaw Federal Circuit database
(“CTAF”), limited by the dates of the period studied. This method successfully determined
the number of summary affirmances because Federal Circuit summary affirmances include
the text, “See Fed. Cir. R. 36.” See, e.g., Brady v. U.S. Postal Serv., 367 F. App’x 149, 150
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number is certainly significant,132 so it was necessary to somehow adjust for these summary affirmances.133
The Federal Circuit was the only one of the circuits studied that
uses summary affirmances in any appreciable amount. Although the
Fifth Circuit, like the Federal Circuit, has a local rule that allows for
the use of summary affirmances,134 the Fifth Circuit uses this tool
much less often than the Federal Circuit. For example, from July 1,
2010, through June 30, 2010, the Fifth Circuit issued only 15 summary
(2010) (“This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED: AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.”). This method yielded fifty-five summary affirmances in the period studied.
The second method involved searching for all opinions on each day of the period
studied on the Federal Circuit’s web site, Opinions and Orders Search, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR
FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions-orders/search/report.html (last visited
Jan. 16, 2012). Each nonprecedential opinion was examined to determine whether it was a
summary affirmance. This method also revealed fifty-five summary affirmances in the period studied.
132. The Federal Circuit seems to be disposing of cases using a greater percentage of
summary affirmances even more today than in the past. See Jason Rantanen, CAFC: Patent
Opinions Down, Rule 36 Affirmances Up, PATENTLYO (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.
com/patent/2011/10/cafc-patent-opinions-down-rule-36-affirmances-up.html (illustrating
the Federal Circuit’s disposition of appeals for 2011 and prior years). Indeed, the Federal
Circuit issued summary affirmances in 42% of its patent cases in 2011. Id. In contrast, the
court issued summary affirmances in only 19%, 22%, and 13% in 2010, 2009, and 2008,
respectively. Id.
133. See Moore, Markman Eight Years Later, supra note 14, at 235. In commenting on
her inclusion of summary affirmances in her claim construction reversal-rate study, Professor Moore explained:
Obviously, eliminating a large group of non-randomly selected cases would affect
the results. [Claim construction reversal-rate s]tudies that did not consider the
Rule 36 summary affirmances eliminated a large group of affirmances from their
dataset. This skewed their results and they report a significantly higher reversal
rate than actually exists.
Id.; see supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text (contrasting studies of claim construction
reversal rates that included summary affirmances with those that disregarded summary
affirmances).
134. 5TH CIR. R. 47.6 (“Affirmance Without Opinion”). Fifth Circuit Rule 47.6 reads as
follows:
The judgment or order may be affirmed or enforced without opinion when the
court determines that an opinion would have no precedential value and that any
one or more of the following circumstances exists and is dispositive of a matter
submitted for decision: (1) that a judgment of the district court is based on findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous; (2) that the evidence in support of a
jury verdict is not insufficient; (3) that the order of an administrative agency is
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; (4) in the case of a
summary judgment, that no genuine issue of material fact has been properly
raised by the appellant; and (5) no reversible error of law appears. In such case,
the court may, in its discretion, enter either of the following orders: “AFFIRMED.
See 5TH CIR. R. 47.6.” or “ENFORCED. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.6.”
Id.

R
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affirmances out of 3192 total cases135—i.e., approximately 0.5% of all
cases. And, during the period studied, the Fifth Circuit issued no summary affirmances at all. Thus, it was not necessary to adjust the data
for the Fifth Circuit. Moreover, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits do not use summary affirmances, so it was not necessary to adjust
the totals for these circuits, either.
It was necessary to determine the best method for adjusting the
Federal Circuit data for summary affirmances. Methods used by other
researchers in other empirical studies of reversal rates would not work
for this study. In other studies, researchers determined the applicability of a particular summary affirmance to the issue under study by analyzing the appeal briefs submitted to the Federal Circuit.136 These
researchers were studying reversal rates on discrete substantive patent
law issues such as nonobviousness137 and claim construction,138 and
they could readily determine from the appeal briefs whether a particular summary affirmance related to the issue being studied. But this
Article’s study looks at reversal rates for different standards of review,
and for many issues, it would be virtually impossible to determine
from the appeal briefs whether the Federal Circuit affirmed based on
a particular standard of review without resorting to mere speculation.
As a result, examining the appeal briefs for each summary affirmance
would not work for this study.
The method that this study used to adjust for summary affirmances in the Federal Circuit was to add affirmances to each standard

135. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIR., CLERK’S ANNUAL REPORT: JUDICIAL WORKLOAD
STATISTICS JULY 2010–JUNE 2011, at 1, 12 (2011), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/
clerk/docs/arstats.pdf.
136. See Cotropia, supra note 19, at 925 (studying nonobviousness); Moore, District
Court Judges, supra note 14, at 8 n.36 (studying claim construction); Moore, Markman Eight
Years Later, supra note 14, at 239 n.31 (studying claim construction).
137. Cotropia, supra note 19, at 925. Nonobviousness is a requirement for obtaining a
patent. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006); see Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How the
Indeterminate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
57, 62 (2008) (“The core requirement for obtaining a patent is that the invention was not
obvious at the time it was made.”). Even if an invention is new and useful, it is not patentable unless it is also nonobvious—that is, the invention must be “a significant advance over
existing technology.” Id. The test to determine whether a particular patent claim is unpatentable or invalid due to obviousness is whether “the differences between the subject matter . . . and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.”
§ 103(a).
138. Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 14, at 8 n.36; Moore, Markman Eight Years
Later, supra note 14, at 239 n.31.

R
R

R
R
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of review in proportion to the frequency of that standard of review.139
For example, the study revealed that the Federal Circuit used the de
novo standard of review in 47.9% of its cases.140 Thus, 47.9% of the 55
summary affirmances (26.3) was added to the total number of de novo
affirmances in non-summary-affirmance dispositions (173), for an adjusted total of 199 affirmances under the de novo standard. All the
other standards of review were similarly adjusted.
Table 3 below summarizes the results of these adjustments, showing how the reversal rates for each standard of review and the overall
reversal rate decreased upon adjustment.

Table 3: Reversal Rates of Federal Circuit—Unadjusted and
Adjusted for Summary Affirmances
Standard of
Review

Federal Circuit
(UNADJUSTED)

Federal Circuit
(ADJUSTED for
Summary
Affirmances)

De novo
Clear error
Substantial
evidence/
Reasonable juror
Abuse of
discretion
OVERALL

37.0%
25.9%

32.1%
22.5%

14.0%

12.2%

20.2%

17.5%

27.7%

24.0%

This method is certainly not perfect. Indeed, whether adjusting
for the overall frequency of each standard of review accurately reflects
the frequency of those standards of review as used in summary affirmances is not verifiable. For example, logic dictates that the court
likely uses summary affirmances in cases in which the standard of review is deferential, thus making for straightforward summary affirmances. Therefore, the frequency of standards of review in summary
affirmances very well may skew towards the more deferential standards
of review such as abuse of discretion or substantial evidence. But be139. See supra Part III.A.1 for a discussion of the frequency of the different standards
of review in the cases studied.
140. See supra Table 2.
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cause of the nature of the summary affirmance, it is not possible to
know.
3. The Federal Circuit in Patent Cases Is Judicially Hyperactive
This part of the study supports the hypothesis that the Federal
Circuit in patent cases is judicially hyperactive. The study shows that
the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in all of its cases—patent and nonpatent—and those in patent cases are significantly greater than the
regional circuits’ reversal rates in patent cases but not significantly
greater than its reversal rates in non-patent cases. Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in patent cases are significantly greater
than its reversal rates in non-patent cases.
First, Part III.A.3.a discusses the differences between the reversal
rates of the Federal Circuit in all cases—patent and non-patent—and
those of the representative regional circuits. Second, Part III.A.3.b discusses the differences between the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in
patent cases and non-patent cases. Third and finally, Part III.A.3.c discusses the differences between the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in
patent cases and those of the representative regional circuits, as well
as the differences between the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in nonpatent cases and those of the representative regional circuits.
a. All Federal Circuit Cases (Patent and Non-Patent) Versus
Regional Circuits
This part of the study supports the premise that the Federal Circuit is more judicially hyperactive than other circuits because the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in all cases—including both patent and
non-patent cases—are greater than those of the representative regional circuits. Indeed, reversal rates under all standards of review, as
well as overall reversal rates, were greater for the Federal Circuit (both
unadjusted and adjusted for summary affirmances) than the corresponding aggregate reversal rates for the representative regional circuits. Importantly, with only one exception,141 these differences were
statistically significant.

141. The lone difference that was not statistically significant was the difference between the Federal Circuit’s adjusted reversal rate and the aggregate reversal rate of the
regional circuits for the substantial evidence/reasonable juror standard of review.
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Table 4 and Table 5 below summarize all these results, and Figure 7 below displays the same results graphically.142 First, Table 4
shows the results for raw Federal Circuit reversal rates, unadjusted for
summary affirmances, for all Federal Circuit cases—i.e., both patent
and non-patent cases. Second, Table 5 shows the results for Federal
Circuit reversal rates adjusted for summary affirmances. Finally, Figure 7 graphically displays all these results, for both unadjusted and
adjusted Federal Circuit reversal rates.

Table 4: Contrast of Reversal Rates of Non-Federal Circuits
with Reversal Rate of Federal Circuit—Unadjusted for
Summary Affirmances
Standard of
Review

NON-FED
OVERALL

Federal Circuit
(UNADJUSTED)

z

p

Statistically
Significant?
(Confidence)

De novo

18.2%

37.0%

5.505

< 0.0001

YES (>99.9%)

Clear error

11.8%

25.9%

2.087

0.0183

YES (98.2%)

Substantial
evidence/
Reasonable
Juror

8.2%

14.0%

1.434

0.0764

YES (92.4%)

Abuse of
discretion

12.8%

20.2%

1.995

0.0228

YES (97.7%)

OVERALL

14.0%

27.7%

6.556

< 0.0001

YES (>99.9%)

Table 5: Contrast of Reversal Rates of Non-Federal Circuits
with Reversal Rate of Federal Circuit—Adjusted for Summary
Affirmances
Standard of
Review

NON-FED
OVERALL

Federal Circuit
(ADJUSTED for
Summ. Aff.’s)

z

p

Statistically
Significant?
(Confidence)

De novo

18.2%

32.1%

4.352

< 0.0001

YES (>99.9%)

Clear error

11.8%

22.5%

1.696

0.0446

YES (95.5%)

Substantial
evidence/
Reasonable
juror

8.2%

12.2%

1.063

0.1446

NO

Abuse of
discretion

12.8%

17.5%

1.499

0.0668

YES (93.3%)

OVERALL

14.0%

24.0%

5.127

< 0.0001

YES (>99.9%)

142. In all instances, reversal rates are calculated as the percentage of issues for which
the court reversed, vacated, or reversed in part. Another way of expressing the quantity of
reversal rate is that it is equal to 100 minus the affirmance rate.
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Figure 7: Contrast of Reversal Rates of Non-Federal Circuits
with Reversal Rate of Federal Circuit

As Table 4 and Table 5 show, the overall reversal rate of the Federal Circuit was statistically significantly greater than that of the representative regional circuits. The overall unadjusted reversal rate of the
Federal Circuit was 27.7%, whereas the overall reversal rate of the representative regional circuits was only 14.0%. This difference is statistically significant to greater than a 99% confidence level. Moreover, the
overall reversal rate of the Federal Circuit adjusted for summary affirmances was 24.0%, which was statistically significantly greater than the
overall reversal rate of the representative regional circuits, also to
greater than a 99% confidence level. These results tend to indicate
that the null hypothesis—that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate is similar to that of the regional circuits—should be rejected, and that the
alternative hypothesis—that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate is
greater than that of the regional circuits—should be accepted.
Table 6 breaks down these results for each circuit.
Just as with overall reversal rate, the reversal rate for the de novo
standard of review of the Federal Circuit was statistically significantly
greater than the corresponding rate of the representative regional
circuits.
Figure 8 below graphically shows the reversal rates for the de
novo standard of review.
As Figure 8 shows, the Federal Circuit reversal rate, both unadjusted
and adjusted for summary affirmances, is greater than each of the re-
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Table 6: Reversal Rates for Each Circuit Studied
Second
Circuit

Fifth
Circuit

Seventh
Circuit

Ninth
Circuit

NON-FED
OVERALL

Federal Circuit
(UNADJUSTED)

Federal
Circuit
(ADJUSTED
for SAs)

De novo

15.5%

14.2%

14.5%

22.6%

18.2%

37.0%

32.1%

Clear error

23.9%

9.3%

17.0%

6.3%

11.8%

25.9%

22.5%

Substantial
evidence/
Reasonable
juror

5.1%

14.3%

18.5%

8.4%

8.2%

14.0%

12.2%

Abuse of
discretion

9.3%

4.3%

21.7%

17.4%

12.8%

20.2%

17.5%

OVERALL

11.5%

10.5%

17.3%

16.7%

14.0%

27.7%

24.0%

Standard
of Review

versal rates for the other individual circuits studied. The unadjusted
reversal rate of the Federal Circuit for the de novo standard was
37.0%, whereas the overall corresponding reversal rate of the repre-

Figure 8: Reversal Rates for De Novo Standard of Review

sentative regional circuits was only 18.2%. This difference is statistically significant to greater than a 99% confidence level. Moreover, the
reversal rate of the Federal Circuit for the de novo standard adjusted
for summary affirmances was 32.1%, which was statistically significantly greater than the overall reversal rate of the representative regional circuits to greater than a 90% confidence level. Therefore,
these results also indicate that the null hypothesis—that the Federal
Circuit’s reversal rate for the de novo standard of review is similar to
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that of the regional circuits—should be rejected, and that the alternative hypothesis—that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate for the de
novo standard is greater than that of the regional circuits—should be
accepted.
Similarly, Table 4 and Table 5 above show that the unadjusted
and adjusted reversal rates for the Federal Circuit for the clear error,
substantial evidence and reasonable juror, and abuse of discretion
standards of review are all greater than the corresponding rates for
the representative regional circuits, taken overall. With one exception,
these differences are all statistically significant to at least a 92% confidence level. Therefore, with one exception, these results also indicate
that the null hypothesis—that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate for
each of these standards of review is similar to that of the regional circuits—should be rejected, and that the alternative hypothesis—that
the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate for each of these standards is
greater than that of the regional circuits—should be accepted.
The one difference that is not statistically significant to at least a
90% confidence level is that of the Federal Circuit’s adjusted reversal
rate and the aggregate regional-circuit reversal rate for the substantial
evidence and reasonable juror standard. Here, the p-value is 0.1446,
which means that there is only an 85.5% chance that this difference is
not merely due to chance. As such, the difference is not statistically
significant to the desired 90% confidence level. Because this one difference is not statistically significant, there is no statistical basis for
rejecting the null hypothesis—that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate
for this standard of review is similar to that of the regional circuits.
But the value of p is not overly high here, and the Federal Circuit’s
reversal rate is about 50% greater than that of the regional circuits.
Thus, increasing the sample size for this standard of review might very
well make the result for this standard of review statistically significant.
And even though the difference for this standard using the current
data is not statistically significant, the fact that the Federal Circuit’s
reversal rates is greater than that of the representative regional circuits, coupled with the still relative low p value, provide at least intuitive support to the alternative hypothesis—that the Federal Circuit’s
reversal rate for this standard is greater than that of the regional
circuits.
However, examining the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate against
that of each individual circuit (rather than against the overall totals
for all the representative circuits) reveals that the Federal Circuit’s
reversal rate does not always exceed that of each individual circuit. For
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example, Figure 9 below graphically shows the reversal rates for the
clear error standard of review for each circuit and overall.

Figure 9: Reversal Rates for Clear Error Standard of Review

Figure 9 shows that although the unadjusted Federal Circuit reversal rate for the clear error standard (25.9%) was greater than that
for all the individual circuits, the adjusted Federal Circuit reversal rate
(22.5%) was not greater than that of the Second Circuit (23.9%). Notably, however, although the reversal rate of the Second Circuit exceeds that of the Federal Circuit (adjusted), this difference is not
statistically significant.143 Thus, this difference between the Federal
Circuit and the Second Circuit, taken individually, likely does not alter
the overall conclusion that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate is greater
than that of the representative regional circuits as a whole.
Similarly, Figure 10 below depicts the reversal rates for the substantial evidence standard of review for each circuit and overall.
As Figure 10 shows, for this standard, the unadjusted Federal Circuit reversal rate (14.0%) and the adjusted Federal Circuit reversal
rate (12.2%) are greater than that of all the other individual circuits
except for the Fifth Circuit (14.3%) and the Seventh Circuit (18.5%).

143. The difference between the reversal rate for the Second Circuit and Federal Circuit (adjusted) was not statistically significant to at least a 90% confidence level (z = 0.142;
p = 0.4443). An increase in sample size for this standard of review might yield significant
results, one way or the other.
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Figure 10: Reversal Rates for Substantial Evidence/
Reasonable Juror Standard of Review

Notably, however, these differences are not statistically significant.144
Again, these differences between the Federal Circuit and the circuits
taken individually likely do not alter the overall conclusion that the
Federal Circuit’s reversal rate is greater than that of the representative
regional circuits.
Finally, Figure 11 below depicts the reversal rates for the abuse of
discretion standard of review for each circuit and overall.
Here, the unadjusted Federal Circuit reversal rate (20.2%) and
the adjusted Federal Circuit reversal rate (17.5%) are greater than
that of all the other individual circuits except for the Seventh Circuit
(21.7%). But again, these differences are not statistically significant.145
144. The difference between the reversal rate for the Fifth Circuit and the Federal
Circuit (unadjusted) was not statistically significant to at least a 90% confidence level
(z = 0.040; p = 0.4840). Similarly, the difference between the reversal rate for the Fifth
Circuit and the Federal Circuit (adjusted) was not statistically significant (z = 0.299;
p = 0.3821).
Additionally, the difference between the reversal rate for the Seventh Circuit and the
Federal Circuit (unadjusted) was not statistically significant to at least a 90% confidence
level (z = 0.533; p = 0.2981). Similarly, the difference between the reversal rate for the
Seventh Circuit and the Federal Circuit (adjusted) was not statistically significant (z =
0.794; p = 0.2148). An increase in sample size for this standard of review might yield significant results, one way or the other.
145. The difference between the reversal rate for the Seventh Circuit and the Federal
Circuit (unadjusted) was not statistically significant to at least a 90% confidence level (z =
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Figure 11: Reversal Rates for Abuse of Discretion Standard of
Review

Thus, these differences between the Federal Circuit and the circuits
taken individually may not alter the overall conclusion that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate is greater than that of the representative
regional circuits.
In sum, this part of the study supports the hypothesis that the
Federal Circuit engages in judicial hyperactivity to a greater extent
than the representative regional circuits studied. Indeed, the Federal
Circuit’s overall reversal rate (both unadjusted and adjusted for summary affirmances) was statistically significantly greater than the overall
reversal rate of the representative regional circuits taken as an aggregate. Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates for the individual
standards of review were statistically significantly greater than those of
the representative regional circuits with only one exception. These results indicate that the hypothesis that the Federal Circuit’s reversal
rate is greater than that of the regional circuits should be accepted.
Therefore, these results support the notion that the Federal Circuit
engages in judicial hyperactivity to a greater extent than the regional
circuits.

0.209; p = 0.4168). Similarly, the difference between the reversal rate for the Seventh Circuit and the Federal Circuit (adjusted) was not statistically significant (z = 0.622; p =
0.2676).
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b. Federal Circuit Patent Cases Versus Federal Circuit Non-Patent
Cases
Separating the Federal Circuit’s patent cases from its non-patent
cases supports the hypothesis that the Federal Circuit is more judicially hyperactive in patent cases than in non-patent cases. Indeed, as
discussed below, the Federal Circuit’s overall reversal rate in patent
cases was significantly greater than in non-patent cases, and the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in patent cases broken down by standards
of review were significantly greater than in non-patent cases for all
standards of review except one.
Table 7 summarizes the results for the Federal Circuit’s reversal
rates in patent versus non-patent cases146 and graphically displays
these results.

Table 7: Contrast of Federal Circuit’s Reversal Rates in Patent
with Non-Patent Cases
Z

Patent
Cases

NonPatent
Cases

z

p

Statistically
Significant?
(Confidence)

De novo

44.9%

26.7%

2.457

0.007

YES (99.3%)

Clear error

17.6%

40.0%

1.283

0.100

YES (90.0%)

Substantial
evidence/
Reasonable
Juror

26.3%

7.9%

1.885

0.030

YES (97.0%)

Abuse of
Discretion

35.1%

11.9%

2.824

0.002

YES (99.8%)

OVERALL

38.0%

18.4%

4.156

<0.0001

YES (>99.9%)

As Table 7 and Figure 12 show, the Federal Circuit’s overall reversal rate in patent cases is statistically significantly greater than in nonpatent cases. The court’s overall reversal rate in patent cases was
38.0%, whereas in non-patent cases it was only 18.4%. This difference
is statistically significant to greater than a 99.9% confidence level.
Table 7 and Figure 12 also show that for the de novo, substantial
evidence/reasonable juror, and abuse of discretion standards of review, the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in patent cases are statistically
significantly greater than in non-patent cases. These differences are
statistically significant to 99.3%, 97.0%, and 99.8% confidence levels,
146. This table reflects reversal rates that are unadjusted for summary affirmances.
Such adjustment is not necessary here for this intracircuit comparison.
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Figure 12: Contrast of Federal Circuit’s Reversal Rates in
Patent with Non-Patent Cases

respectively. The only standard of review where the court’s reversal
rate was greater in non-patent cases than in patent cases was the clear
error standard. Strangely, for the clear error standard of review, the
court’s reversal rate in non-patent cases was 40.0%, whereas its reversal rate in patent cases was only 17.6%. And this difference is statistically significant—though barely—to a 90.0% confidence level. Thus,
this part of the study also tends to support the hypothesis that the
Federal Circuit is judicially hyperactive in patent cases.
c. Federal Circuit Patent Cases and Non-Patent Cases Versus
Regional Circuits
The Federal Circuit’s overall reversal rate in patent cases was significantly greater than the overall reversal rate of the representative
regional circuits combined, and the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in
patent cases broken down by standards of review were significantly
greater than those of the representative regional circuits for all standards of review except one. But the Federal Circuit’s adjusted overall
reversal rate in non-patent cases was not significantly greater than the
regional circuits’ overall reversal rate, and the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in non-patent cases broken down by standards of review were
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not significantly greater than the reversal rates of the representative
regional circuits except for one standard of review.
Table 8 below shows the results for Federal Circuit reversal rates
in patent cases only, adjusted for summary affirmances, contrasted
with the reversal rates for the aggregate representative regional circuits. Table 9 breaks down these results for each circuit, and Figure 13
and Figure 14 graphically display all these results.

Table 8: Contrast of Reversal Rates of Non-Federal Circuits
with Reversal Rates of Federal Circuit in Patent Cases—
Adjusted for Summary Affirmances
NON-FED
OVERALL

Federal Circuit
Patent Cases
(ADJUSTED for
Summ. Aff.’s)

z

p

De novo

18.2%

35.4%

4.446

<0.0001

YES (>99.9%)

Clear error

11.8%

14.2%

0.328

0.374

NO

Substantial
evidence/
Reasonable
juror

8.2%

18.1%

1.781

0.0375

YES (96.2%)

Abuse of
discretion

12.8%

24.6%

2.376

0.0087

YES (99.1%)

OVERALL

14.0%

28.8%

5.850

<0.0001

YES (>99.9%)

Standard
of Review

Statistically
Significant?
(Confidence)

Table 9: Contrast of Reversal Rates for Each Circuit Studied
with Federal Circuit Patent Cases
Standard
of Review

NON-FED
OVERALL

Federal
Circuit
Patent Cases
(ADJUSTED
for SAs)

22.6%

18.2%

35.4

6.3%

11.8%

14.2

18.5%

8.4%

8.2%

18.1

4.3%

21.7%

17.4%

12.8%

24.6

10.5%

17.3%

16.7%

14.0%

28.8

Second
Circuit

Fifth
Circuit

Seventh
Circuit

Ninth
Circuit

De novo

15.5%

14.2%

14.5%

Clear error

23.9%

9.3%

17.0%

Substantial
evidence/
Reasonable
juror

5.1%

14.3%

Abuse of
discretion

9.3%

OVERALL

11.5%

As Table 8 shows, the Federal Circuit’s overall reversal rate in patent cases (adjusted for summary affirmances) was statistically signifi-
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Figure 13: Contrast of Reversal Rates of Non-Federal Circuits
with Reversal Rates of Federal Circuit in Patent Cases—
Breakdown by Standards of Review

cantly greater than the regional circuits’ overall reversal rate in all
cases studied. The Federal Circuit’s overall adjusted reversal rate in
patent cases was 28.8%, whereas the overall reversal rate of the representative regional circuits was only 14.0% This difference is statistically
significant to greater than a 99.9% confidence level. Breaking down
the results by standards of review, Table 8 shows that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in patent cases for all standards of review (adjusted
for summary affirmances) are greater than those of the representative
regional circuits. And these differences are statistically significant for
all standards of review except for one—clear error. Thus, these results
tend to indicate that the null hypothesis—that the Federal Circuit’s
reversal rate in patent cases is similar to that of the regional circuits—
should be rejected, and that the alternative hypothesis—that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate is greater than that of the regional circuits—should be accepted.
In contrast, the Federal Circuit’s adjusted overall reversal rate in
non-patent cases is not significantly greater than the overall reversal
rate of the representative regional circuits combined, and the Federal
Circuit’s adjusted reversal rates in non-patent cases broken down by
standards of review were similarly not significantly greater than those
of the representative regional circuits for all standards of review ex-
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Figure 14: Contrast of Reversal Rates of Non-Federal Circuits
with Reversal Rates of Federal Circuit in Patent Cases—
Breakdown by Standards of Review and by Circuit

cept one. First, Table 10 shows the results for Federal Circuit reversal
rates in non-patent cases only, adjusted for summary affirmances. Table 11 breaks down these results for each circuit, and Figure 15 and
Figure 16 graphically display all these results.

Table 10: Contrast of Reversal Rates of Non-Federal Circuits
with Reversal Rates of Federal Circuit in Non-Patent Cases—
Adjusted for Summary Affirmances
Standard
of Review

NON-FED
OVERALL

Federal Circuit
Patent Cases
(ADJUSTED for
Summ. Aff.’s)

z

p

Statistically
Significant?
(Confidence)

De novo

18.2%

19.7%

0.368

0.3557

NO

Clear error

11.8%

28.3%

1.821

0.0344

YES (96.6%)

Substantial
evidence/
Reasonable
juror

8.2%

6.4%

0.430

0.3336

NO

Abuse of
discretion

12.8%

9.7%

0.799

0.2119

NO

OVERALL

14.0%

14.3%

0.128

0.4483

NO
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Table 11: Contrast of Reversal Rates for Each Circuit Studied
with Federal Circuit Non-Patent Cases
Second
Circuit

Fifth
Circuit

Seventh
Circuit

Ninth
Circuit

NON-FED
OVERALL

Federal
Circuit
Patent Cases
(ADJUSTED
for SAs)

De novo

15.5%

14.2%

14.5%

22.6%

18.2%

19.7%

Clear error

23.9%

9.3%

17.0%

6.3%

11.8%

28.3%

Substantial
evidence/
Reasonable
juror

5.1%

14.3%

18.5%

8.4%

8.2%

6.4%

Abuse of
discretion

9.3%

4.3%

21.7%

17.4%

12.8%

9.7%

OVERALL

11.5%

10.5%

17.3%

16.7%

14.0%

14.3%

Standard
of Review

Figure 15: Contrast of Reversal Rates of Non-Federal Circuits
with Reversal Rates of Federal Circuit in Non-Patent Cases—
Breakdown by Standards of Review

As Table 10 shows, the overall reversal rate in non-patent cases
(adjusted for summary affirmances) was not statistically significantly
greater than the regional circuits’ overall reversal rate in all cases studied. The Federal Circuit’s overall adjusted reversal rate in non-patent
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Figure 16: Contrast of Reversal Rates of Non-Federal Circuits
with Reversal Rates of Federal Circuit in Non-Patent Cases—
Breakdown by Standards of Review and by Circuit

cases was 14.3%, whereas the overall reversal rate of the representative
regional circuits was 14.0%. This difference is not statistically significant.147 Additionally, breaking down the results by standards of review, Table 10 shows that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates for all
standards of review except one are not statistically significantly greater
than those of the representative regional circuits. Indeed, for two of
the standards of review—substantial evidence and reasonable juror
and abuse of discretion—the overall reversal rates of the regional circuits are actually greater than those of the Federal Circuit, though not
statistically significantly so. The only exception is for the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate for the clear error standard of review, which is statistically significantly greater than the corresponding reversal rate for
the representative regional circuits to a confidence level of 96.6%.
Thus, these results overall tend to indicate that the null hypothesis
here—that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate in non-patent cases is
similar to that of the regional circuits—cannot be rejected, and that
there is no statistical basis for accepting the alternative hypothesis—

147. Indeed, p = 0.448, which means that the probability that this difference is due to
chance is a very high 44.8%.
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that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate in non-patent cases is greater
than that of the regional circuits.
In sum, this part of the study further supports the hypothesis that
the Federal Circuit engages in judicial hyperactivity in patent cases to
a greater extent than the representative regional circuits studied. Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s overall reversal rate in patent cases was
statistically significantly greater than the Federal Circuit’s overall reversal rate in non-patent cases. Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s adjusted overall reversal rate in patent cases was statistically significantly
greater than the overall reversal rate of the representative regional
circuits taken as an aggregate. But the Federal Circuit’s adjusted overall reversal rate in non-patent cases was not statistically significantly
greater than the regional circuits’ overall reversal rate. And breaking
the data down by particular standards of review reveals similar results.
The Federal Circuit’s reversal rates for the individual standards of review in patent cases were statistically significantly greater than those of
the representative regional circuits, with only one exception. But the
Federal Circuit’s reversal rates for the individual standards of review
in non-patent cases were not statistically significantly greater than
those of the representative regional circuits, again with only one exception. These results indicate that the hypothesis that the Federal
Circuit’s reversal rate in its patent cases is greater than the reversal
rates of the regional circuits should be accepted, and they also support the notion that the Federal Circuit engages in judicial hyperactivity in its patent cases to a greater extent than the regional circuits.
B. Results: Reversal Rates for Several Examples of Procedural
Postures
The results of this part of the study also support the hypothesis
that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate is greater than that of the regional circuits should be accepted. For all three examples of procedural postures examined, there is a statistically significant difference
between the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate and the mean reversal rate
of the representative regional circuits studied. These results tend to
confirm that the Federal Circuit is more judicially hyperactive than
other circuits.
This Part discusses the results of the second part of the study in
detail. Part III.B.1 discusses the results with respect to summary judgment cases. Part III.B.2 discusses the results with respect to JMOL
cases. And Part III.B.3 discusses the results with respect to preliminary
injunction cases.
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1. Summary Judgment
The results of this study show that the Federal Circuit reverses
summary judgment decisions at a statistically significantly greater rate
than do the representative regional circuits studied. A motion for
summary judgment allows a party to dispense with a trial when there is
“no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”148 Disposition of patent cases through
summary judgment is common, just as for other types of cases.149 A
court of appeals reviews the grant of a motion for summary judgment
under a de novo standard150 and reviews the denial of a motion for
summary judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.151
Table 12 below gives the results for reversal rates for the Federal
Circuit and the regional circuits examined.
As Table 12 shows, the Federal Circuit reversed, at least in part,
the district court’s decision on summary judgment in 42.5% of the
cases studied. In contrast, the regional circuits reversed these decisions, at least in part, an average of only 22.5%. This difference is
statistically significant to a 99.7% confidence level.152
Figure 17 below shows the breakdown of overall reversal rates for
each individual circuit studied.

148. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see, e.g., Del. Valley Floral Grp. v. Shaw Rose Nets, LLC, 597
F.3d 1374, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (modified 2010)) (reviewing de novo a district court’s decision granting summary judgment). The trial court
must draw all reasonable inferences “in favor of the non-movant” and must treat the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” Id. at 1379 (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
149. For example, Delaware Valley Floral Group, 597 F.3d at 1374–84, is a recent typical
patent case resolved on summary judgment. In this case, the Federal Circuit reviewed the
district court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment that invalidated the patentee’s
patent based on the on-sale bar. Id. at 1378–79. As in any summary judgment case, the
court largely focused on whether issues of material fact existed that would have precluded
judgment as a matter of law in favor of the accused infringer. Id. at 1379.
150. E.g., Conroy v. Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 14 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“This court
reviews de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment.”).
151. E.g., Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (“This court reviews a denial of a motion for summary judgment for an abuse of
discretion.”).
152. The value of z is 2.79, and the value of p is 0.00264. Thus, the difference is statistically significant to a 99.7% confidence level.
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Table 12: Summary Judgment—Reversal Rates Data
Rev’d +
Vacated +
Rev’d in
Part

Affirmed

Reversed

Vacated

Reversed in
Part

Federal
Circuit

57.5%

10.0%

5.0%

27.5%

42.5%

Non-Fed
Circuits
(MEAN)

77.2%

6.8%

5.9%

9.9%

22.5%

2d

75.3%

5.0%

8.7%

10.5%

24.2%

5th

87.2%

8.5%

0.0%

4.3%

12.8%

7th

84.1%

4.5%

2.3%

9.1%

15.9%

9th

68.9%

15.6%

2.2%

13.3%

31.1%

Circuit

Figure 17: Summary Judgment—Overall Reversal Rates for
Individual Circuits

As Table 12 and Figure 17 show, the Ninth Circuit is the circuit
whose overall reversal rate is the closest to that of the Federal Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit’s reversal rate is 31.1%, which is still somewhat
lower than the Federal Circuit’s rate of 42.5%. However, this difference is not statistically significant.153 But the differences between the
153. The value of z is 1.09, and the value of p is 0.1379. Thus, although the Federal
Circuit’s reversal rate appears on first glance to be significantly larger than that of the
Ninth Circuit, this difference is not statistically significant.
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Federal Circuit’s reversal rate and that of the Second (24.2%), Fifth
(12.8%), and Seventh (15.9%) Circuits are statistically significant to
greater than a 99% confidence level.154
This part of the study shows that the Federal Circuit reverses summary judgment decisions at a statistically significantly greater rate
than do the representative regional circuits studied. These results also
tend to indicate that the hypothesis that the Federal Circuit’s reversal
rate for summary judgment decisions is greater than that of the regional circuits should be accepted. And this part of the study also
tends to confirm the hypothesis that the Federal Circuit is more “judicially hyperactive” than the regional circuits studied.
2. Judgment as a Matter of Law
As with summary judgment, the results of this study show that the
Federal Circuit reverses decisions of district courts involving JMOL at
a statistically significantly higher rate than do the representative regional circuits studied.
Table 13 below gives the results for reversal rates for the Federal
Circuit and the regional circuits examined.

Table 13: JMOL—Reversal Rates Data
Affirmed

Reversed

Vacated

Reversed
in Part

Rev’d + Vacated
+ Rev’d in Part

Federal
Circuit

47.7%

21.5%

4.6%

26.2%

52.3%

Non-Fed
Circuits
(MEAN)

77.0%

13.3%

1.6%

8.2%

23.0%

2d

79.2%

10.4%

4.2%

6.3%

20.8%

5th

80.8%

12.1%

1.0%

6.1%

19.2%

7th

70.3%

18.9%

0.0%

10.8%

29.7%

9th

73.6%

13.9%

1.4%

11.1%

26.4%

Circuit

As Table 13 shows, the Federal Circuit reversed, at least in part,
the district court’s decision on JMOL in 52.3% of the cases studied. In
154. The value of z for the Federal Circuit’s rate compared to the Second Circuit’s rate
is 2.40, which corresponds to a p-value of 0.00880. Thus, this difference is significant to a
99.2% confidence level. The value of z for the Federal Circuit’s rate compared to the Fifth
Circuit’s rate is 3.13, which corresponds to a p-value of 0.00087. Thus, this difference is
significant to a 99.9% confidence level. Finally, the value of z for the Federal Circuit’s rate
compared to the Seventh Circuit’s rate is 2.70, which corresponds to a p-value of 0.0035.
Thus, this difference is significant to a 99.6% confidence level.
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contrast, the regional circuits reversed these decisions, at least in part,
an average of only 23.0% of the time. This difference is statistically
significant to a 99% confidence level.155
Figure 18 below shows the breakdown of overall reversal rates for
each individual circuit studied.

Figure 18: JMOL—Overall Reversal Rates for Individual
Circuits

As Table 13 and Figure 18 show, the Seventh Circuit is the circuit
whose overall reversal rate is the closest to that of the Federal Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit’s reversal rate is 29.7%, which is significantly
lower than the Federal Circuit’s rate of 52.3%. Indeed, this difference
is statistically significant to a 95% confidence level.156 Moreover, the
differences between the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate and that of the
Second (20.8%), Fifth (19.2%), and Ninth (26.4%) Circuits are statistically significant to a 99% confidence level.157 The results of this part
155. For this difference, z = 4.65 and p < 0.0001. Thus, this difference is statistically
significant to greater than a 99.9% confidence level.
156. For this difference, z = 2.21 and p = 0.0136. Thus, this difference is statistically
significant to a 98.6% confidence level.
157. The value of z for the Federal Circuit’s rate compared to the Second Circuit’s rate
is 3.40, which corresponds to a p-value of 0.00034. Thus, this difference is significant to
greater than a 99.9% confidence level. The value of z for the Federal Circuit’s rate compared to the Fifth Circuit’s rate is 4.43, which corresponds to a p-value of 0.00003. Thus,
this difference is also significant to greater than a 99.9% confidence level. Finally, the value
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of the study show that the Federal Circuit reverses JMOL decisions at a
statistically significantly greater rate than do the representative regional circuits studied. These results also support the hypothesis that
the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate for JMOL decisions is greater than
that of the regional circuits. This part of the study also tends to confirm the hypothesis that the Federal Circuit is more “judicially hyperactive” than the regional circuits studied.
3. Preliminary Injunction
For cases involving preliminary injunctions, although the difference is not as striking as for summary judgment and JMOL, the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate is nonetheless statistically significantly
greater than the mean rate of the representative regional circuits. To
succeed in a motion for preliminary injunction, the “the moving party
must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits,
irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction, a balance
of hardships tipping in its favor, and the injunction’s favorable impact
on the public interest.”158 Under the Federal Circuit’s test, “[t]hese
factors, taken individually, are not dispositive; rather, the district court
must weigh and measure each factor against the other factors and
against the form and magnitude of the relief requested.”159 However,
to succeed, the movant must establish “both of the first two factors,
i.e., likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm.”160 The
Federal Circuit has characterized the preliminary injunction as “a
drastic and extraordinary remedy that is not to be routinely
granted.”161 A court of appeals reviews the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction under an abuse of discretion standard.162
of z for the Federal Circuit’s rate compared to the Ninth Circuit’s rate is 3.11, which corresponds to a p-value of 0.00094. Thus, this difference is yet again significant to greater than
a 99.9% confidence level.
158. Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 357 F.3d 1319, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
159. Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
160. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir
2001). (emphasis omitted).
161. Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993); accord
Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (characterizing the preliminary injunction as “extraordinary . . . relief”); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc., 906
F.2d 679, 683 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“A preliminary injunction is a drastic remedy.”).
162. E.g., Am. Signature, Inc. v. United States, 598 F.3d 816, 823 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The
governing standard of review on appeal of a grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is
abuse of discretion.”); Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“This court reviews the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of
discretion.”).
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Table 14 below gives the results for reversal rates for the Federal
Circuit and the regional circuits examined.

Table 14: Preliminary Injunction—Reversal Rates Data
Affirmed

Reversed

Vacated

Reversed
in Part

Rev’d + Vacated
+ Rev’d in Part

Federal
Circuit

51.3%

10.3%

30.8%

7.7%

48.7%

Non-Fed
Circuits
(MEAN)

65.4%

14.2%

13.6%

6.8%

34.6%

2d

67.0%

9.9%

16.5%

6.6%

33.0%

5th

61.8%

1.8%

27.3%

9.1%

38.2%

7th

59.5%

16.7%

21.4%

2.4%

40.5%

9th

67.3%

20.0%

5.5%

7.3%

32.7%

Circuit

As Table 14 shows, the Federal Circuit reversed, at least in part,
the district court’s decision on preliminary injunctions in 48.7% of
the cases studied. In contrast, the regional circuits reversed these decisions, at least in part, an average of 34.6% of the time. This difference
is statistically significant to a 95.9% confidence level.163
Figure 19 below shows the breakdown of overall reversal rates for
each individual circuit studied.
As Table 14 and Figure 19 show, the Seventh Circuit is the circuit
whose overall reversal rate is the closest to that of the Federal Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit’s reversal rate is 40.5%, which is slightly lower
than the Federal Circuit’s rate of 48.7%. However, this difference is
not statistically significant.164 The circuit with the next-closest reversal
rate to the Federal Circuit is the Fifth Circuit, whose reversal rate is
38.2%. This difference is also not statistically significant to a 90% confidence level.165 But the differences between the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate and that of the Second (33.0%) and Ninth (32.7%)
Circuits are statistically significant to a 90% confidence level.166
163. For this difference, z = 1.741 and p = 0.04093. Thus, this difference is statistically
significant to a 95.9% confidence level.
164. Here, z = 0.742 and p = 0.230. Thus, this difference is not statistically significant.
165. Here, z = 1.01 and p = 0.156. Thus, this difference is not statistically significant.
166. The value of z for the Federal Circuit’s rate compared to the Second Circuit’s rate
is 1.69, which corresponds to a p-value of 0.0455. Thus, this difference is significant to a
95.4% confidence level. The value of z for the Federal Circuit’s rate compared to the Ninth
Circuit’s rate is 1.88, which corresponds to a p-value of 0.0300. Thus, this difference is
significant to a 97.0% confidence level.
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Figure 19: Preliminary Injunction—Overall Reversal Rates for
Individual Circuits

The results of this part of the study show that the Federal Circuit
reverses preliminary injunction decisions at a statistically significantly
greater rate than do the representative regional circuits studied.
These results also support the hypothesis that the Federal Circuit’s
reversal rate for preliminary injunction decisions is greater than that
of the regional circuits. And this part of the study also tends to confirm the hypothesis that the Federal Circuit is more “judicially hyperactive” than the regional circuits studied.
In sum, the outcome of this second part of the study also indicates that the hypothesis that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate in general is greater than that of the regional circuits should be accepted.
For all three example procedural postures studied, the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate was statistically significantly greater than that of the
representative regional circuits taken as an aggregate. Ultimately,
these results also tend to empirically confirm that the Federal Circuit
has engaged in a greater degree of judicial hyperactivity than the representative regional circuits studied.

IV.

Possible Reasons for the Results of This Study

With few exceptions, the results of this study show that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates—particularly in patent cases—are signifi-
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cantly greater than those of the representative regional circuits
studied. This Part discusses several possible reasons for these results,
including the nature of patent cases themselves, the nature of the Federal Circuit judges, and the relative workloads of the Federal Circuit
contrasted with those of the regional circuits studied.
A. The Nature of Patent Cases
One possible reason for the results of this study is the nature of
patent cases themselves. Patent cases are generally both legally and
technically complex—more so than the average non-patent case that a
court hears.167 Because of this complexity, district court judges who
are inexperienced with patent cases are more likely to commit reversible errors than they are with other types of cases.168 As a result, the
Federal Circuit’s reversal rates would naturally be greater in patent
cases than in non-patent cases, and the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates
would naturally be greater in patent cases than the regional circuits’
reversal rates. If this proposition is true, greater reversal rates may be a
necessary outcome of the complexity of patent law, and the judicial
hyperactivity identified by Rooklidge and Weil169 may not be fully responsible for the Federal Circuit’s relatively high reversal rates in patent cases.
167. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 7 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 17 (“The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will be considering cases that are unusually complex and technical.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1455 (2010)
(“Patent law’s technical complexity was a principal reason for the Federal Circuit’s creation. Patent law frequently seems remote and unusually technical to lawyers specializing in
other areas, in large part because its legal determinations typically require deep understanding of the technology or industry at issue in any particular patent.” (footnotes omitted)); Kali Murray & Esther van Zimmeren, Dynamic Patent Governance in Europe and the
United States: The Myriad Example, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 308–09 (2011)
(“Patent law is widely regarded as a very complex field of law because of its difficult legal
framework, procedures and concepts, as well as the inherently technical nature of patents.”); Schwartz, supra note 59, at 227 (“Patent law is difficult. Not only is the law intricate
and ever-changing, but the patents themselves describe complex and often cutting-edge
technologies.” (footnote omitted)).
168. But an empirical study by Professor David L. Schwartz tends to refute this possibility. See generally Schwartz, supra note 59. Professor Schwartz analyzed “the reversal rates [in
claim construction decisions] of district court judges with varying levels of patent experience.” Id. at 225. He concluded from his analysis that “[c]ontrary to theory, district court
judges do not appear to improve based upon various measures of experience.” Id. at 267.
In other words, according to the results of Professor Schwartz’s study, the relative patent
inexperience by district court judges does not necessarily account for the Federal Circuit’s
relatively high reversal rates in patent cases as seen in this Article’s study.
169. See supra Part I.A (describing Rooklidge’s and Weil’s contentions that the Federal
Circuit acts improperly as both an advocate and a fact finder).
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Congress has suspected that the relative inexperience of district
court judges with patent cases may be undesirable and has enacted a
pilot program designed to help remedy this perceived problem.170 In
2011, Congress introduced this program “in certain United States district courts to encourage enhancement of expertise in patent cases
among district judges.”171 Under this program, in certain designated
districts, judges will be permitted to volunteer as desiring to hear patent cases.172 New patent cases will be assigned at random to a judge as
always.173 But the judge to whom the case is assigned has the option of
turning it down.174 If that judge turns it down, then the case will be
randomly assigned to one of the judges who volunteered as desiring to
hear patent cases.175 Thus, the hope is that these judges will become
more experienced at patent law and, as a result, be reversed less often
by the Federal Circuit.176
A follow-up to this Article’s study may help shed light on whether
this pilot program is successful. After a sufficient time period for the
pilot program to work, such a follow-up study could examine the reversal rates of these volunteer judges in patent cases as compared to
the same judges’ reversal rates in non-patent cases, as well as the reversal rates of the volunteer judges in patent cases as compared to the
reversal rates in patent cases of non-volunteer judges. If the reversal
rates of the volunteer judges in patent cases are comparable to their
reversal rates in non-patent cases, and if the reversal rates of the volunteer judges in patent cases are significantly less than those in patent
cases of non-volunteer judges, then these results would tend to confirm that the pilot program was having its desired effect.

170. Patent Cases Pilot Program, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011); see Press
Release, U.S. Courts, District Courts Selected for Patent Pilot Program (June 7, 2011),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/news/newsview/11-06-07/District_Courts_Selected_
for_Patent_Pilot_Program.aspx (announcing the implementation the Patent Pilot Program). This pilot program is slated to run for ten years. § 1(c), 124 Stat. at 3675.
171. 124 Stat. at 3674.
172. § 1(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 3674.
173. § 1(a)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 3674.
174. § 1(a)(1)(C), 124 Stat. at 3674.
175. § 1(a)(1)(D), 124 Stat. at 3674.
176. Professor Schwartz’s empirical study of how judicial experience in patent cases
affects reversal rates predicts that this pilot program will not be successful in reducing the
Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in claim construction decisions. Schwartz, supra note 59, at
262 (“[F]unneling patent cases via the Patent Pilot Program to a smaller subset of judges,
on its own, is unlikely to reduce the reversal rate.”); see supra note 168 (providing an overview of Professor Schwartz’s study).
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B. The Nature of the Federal Circuit Judges Themselves
Another possible reason for the Federal Circuit’s relatively high
reversal rates in patent cases may be the nature of the Federal Circuit
judges themselves. It may be that the type of judges who serve on the
Federal Circuit are more prone to judicial hyperactivity than the type
of judges who serve on the other circuits due to personality, background, experience, or temperament. If this proposition is true, reducing judicial hyperactivity on the Federal Circuit in patent cases
may require appointment of different types of judges to the Federal
Circuit.
This proposition is not largely responsible, if at all, for the judicial hyperactivity seen in this study. This proposition would more
likely be true if the Federal Circuit were a specialized patent court.
But it is not—Congress deliberately included many other areas of law
aside from patent law within the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to prevent the Federal Circuit from becoming a specialized patent court.177
In fact, far from all Federal Circuit judges have had technical or patent-law backgrounds.178 Judges with such backgrounds might be
tempted to be more judicially hyperactive—particularly within the
area of their expertise. But because the Federal Circuit judges do not
all share this type of background, it is not likely that the court’s judges
as a whole possess character traits that would cause them to be judicially hyperactive.
In addition, if the Federal Circuit judges possess character traits
that caused them to be judicially hyperactive, then the court’s reversal
rates even in non-patent cases should be significantly greater than
those of the regional circuits. But instead this study shows that the
Federal Circuit’s reversal rates in non-patent cases are comparable to
the reversal rates of the representative regional circuits studied.179
Therefore, it is not likely that the Federal Circuit’s relatively high re177. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006); see Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent
Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1642 (2007) (“[I]n an attempt to avoid
creating an overly specialized court, Congress included within the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit appeals involving other areas of the law, including takings cases, government
contract cases, trade appeals from the Court of International Trade and the International
Trade Commission, and personnel appeals from the Merit Systems Protection Board.”
(footnote omitted)).
178. See Moore, Markman Eight Years Later, supra note 14, at 245 (“It is a common
misconception that all the Federal Circuit judges were first engineers or scientists. In fact,
only four of the twenty judges in [Professor Moore’s 2005] study had some sort of scientific
background . . . .”).
179. See infra Part III.A.3.c for a detailed discussion of these results.

R
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versal rates are caused in any large part by the nature of the Federal
Circuit judges themselves.
C. Relative Workloads Between the Federal Circuit and Other
Circuits
Another possible reason for the relatively high reversal rates of
the Federal Circuit, particularly in patent cases, may be that the Federal Circuit’s workload is significantly less than that of other circuits.
Table 15 below depicts the number of cases pending per active
judge for each of the circuits involved in this study.

Table 15: Relative Workloads Between the Federal Circuit and
Other Circuits
Circuit
2d
5th
7th
9th
OVERALL
NON-FED
Federal

Cases Pending
(2008)180

No. of Active
Judges181

Cases Pending Per
Active Judge

5678
4936
2255
17,001
29,870

13
17
11
28
69

436.8
290.4
205.0
607.2
432.9

947

12

78.9

As this table shows, the average number of cases pending per judge
for the regional circuits in 2008 was 426.7, whereas for the Federal
Circuit it was only 78.9. In other words, judges of the representative
regional circuits studied have a much heavier caseload than Federal
Circuit judges. This lighter caseload may provide Federal Circuit
judges with time to delve more deeply into particular issues and give
less deference to district court decisions than do their regional circuit
counterparts. Thus, the Federal Circuit’s relatively light workload may
180. The values for the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits came from Table B-1,
supra note 107. The value for the Federal Circuit comes from Table B-8: U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit—Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending During the Twelve-Month Period
Ended September 30, 2009, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/
images/stories/the-court/statistics/b08sep09.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2012).
181. These values represent the number of judges authorized for each circuit by law.
28 U.S.C. § 44 (2006). Thus, for a circuit with judicial vacancies—a common occurrence—
the number of cases pending per active judge may actually be higher than the value given
in Table 15. See supra Table 15. But this data nonetheless allows for a useful, though
somewhat rough, comparison.
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contribute to its seeming judicial hyperactivity, particularly in patent
law, the area of law for which the Federal Circuit is best known.

Conclusion
The results of this study tend to confirm the hypothesis that the
Federal Circuit is more judicially hyperactive than other circuits, particularly in patent cases. The first part of this study showed that the
overall reversal rate of the Federal Circuit—both unadjusted and adjusted for summary affirmances—was statistically significantly greater
than the overall reversal rate of the representative regional circuits
taken as an aggregate. Additionally, for all but one standard of review,
the reversal rates of the Federal Circuit were statistically significantly
greater than the corresponding reversal rates of the representative regional circuits treated as an aggregate. These results empirically confirm that the Federal Circuit is more judicially hyperactive than other
circuits.
In addition, for all but one standard of review, the reversal rates
of the Federal Circuit in patent cases were significantly greater than in
non-patent cases. These results tend to show that the Federal Circuit is
more judicially hyperactive in patent cases than in non-patent cases.
In addition, the reversal rates of the Federal Circuit in patent
cases were significantly greater than the reversal rates of the regional
circuits, but the reversal rates of the Federal Circuit in non-patent
cases were not significantly greater than the reversal rates of the regional circuits, with just one exception. These results tend to indicate
that the Federal Circuit in patent cases is more judicially hyperactive
than the regional circuits, but that the Federal Circuit in non-patent
cases is not more judicially hyperactive than the regional circuits.
The results of the second part of the study also indicate that the
reversal rate of the Federal Circuit is greater than those of the regional circuits. For each of the three example procedural postures examined in the second part of this study—summary judgment, JMOL,
and preliminary injunction—the reversal rate of the Federal Circuit
was significantly greater than that of the representative regional circuits taken as an aggregate. These results again tend to empirically
confirm that the Federal Circuit has engaged in a greater degree of
judicial hyperactivity than the representative regional circuits studied.
At least two follow-up studies might helpfully add to the results of
this study. One such study would analyze whether judicial hyperactiv-
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ity in the Federal Circuit is judge-dependent.182 Perhaps the reversal
rates of only particular judges are greater than that of other circuits,
and such a study would reveal this fact if it exists. Another possible
follow-up study would compare the reversal rates in patent cases of
particular districts with reversal rates of that regional circuit court
only, rather than comparing them with the representative regional circuits as a whole, as this study did. Such a study might show whether
the Federal Circuit reverses those districts any more or less than those
districts’ regional circuits do.
In conclusion, this study tends to confirm what practitioners,
judges, and commentators have suspected for a long time—that the
Federal Circuit is more judicially hyperactive than other circuits. As
warned by William C. Rooklidge and Matthew F. Weil, judicial hyperactivity tends to “increase unpredictability and uncertainty, erode confidence in the courts, and ultimately encourage more unmeritorious
appeals.”183 The purpose of this study was to use empirical data to
either confirm or refute the widely held belief that the Federal Circuit
is a judicially hyperactive court. This study empirically demonstrates
that this widely held belief is likely true. Therefore, this study replaces
mere anecdotal evidence with quantitative empirical evidence that the
Federal Circuit is a judicially hyperactive court.

182. The author is currently pursuing this follow-up study.
183. Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 2, at 752.

R
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Appendix A: Raw Data—Overall Reversal Rates and Reversal
Rates for Particular Standards of Review
Tables 16–22 below show the raw data gathered for each circuit
studied. Each table shows for each standard of review (de novo, clear
error, substantial evidence, reasonable juror, and abuse of discretion)
the number of issues affirmed, reversed, vacated, and affirmed in part
or reversed in part. Each table also shows totals for each of these
categories.

Table 16: Raw Data—Second Circuit
Issues
Aff’d

Issues
Rev’d

Issues
Vacated

Issues
Aff’d in
Part

TOTAL

De novo

191

10

21

4

226

Clear error

35

1

9

1

46

Substantial
evidence/
Reasonable
juror

166

1

6

2

175

Abuse of
discretion

137

3

11

0

151

OVERALL

529

15

47

7

598

Standard of
Review

Table 17: Raw Data—Fifth Circuit
Issues
Aff’d

Issues
Rev’d

Issues
Vacated

Issues
Aff’d in
Part

TOTAL

De novo

163

9

14

4

190

Clear error

97

1

9

0

107

Substantial
evidence/
Reasonable
juror

30

3

1

1

35

Abuse of
discretion

111

2

3

0

116

OVERALL

401

15

27

5

448

Standard of
Review
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Table 18: Raw Data—Seventh Circuit
Issues
Aff’d

Issues
Rev’d

Issues
Vacated

Issues
Aff’d in
Part

TOTAL

De novo

65

5

5

1

76

Clear error

39

3

5

0

47

Substantial
evidence/
Reasonable
juror

22

2

3

0

27

Abuse of
discretion

36

4

4

2

46

OVERALL

162

14

17

3

196

Standard of
Review

Table 19: Raw Data—Ninth Circuit
Issues
Aff’d

Issues
Rev’d

Issues
Vacated

Issues
Aff’d in
Part

TOTAL

De novo

284

41

26

16

367

Clear error

90

1

5

0

96

Substantial
evidence/
Reasonable
juror

142

2

8

3

155

Abuse of
discretion

195

19

20

2

236

OVERALL

711

63

59

21

854

Standard of
Review

Table 20: Raw Data—Federal Circuit (All Cases)
Issues
Aff’d

Issues
Rev’d

Issues
Vacated

Issues
Aff’d in
Part

TOTAL

De novo

109

37

21

6

173

Clear error

20

5

1

1

27

Substantial
evidence/
Reasonable
juror

49

1

6

1

57

Abuse of
discretion

83

7

12

2

104

OVERALL

261

50

40

10

361

Standard of
Review

11:30
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Table 21: Raw Data—Federal Circuit (Patent Cases Only)
Issues
Aff’d

Issues
Rev’d

Issues
Vacated

Issues
Aff’d in
Part

TOTAL

De novo

54

26

13

5

98

Clear error

14

3

0

0

17

Substantial
evidence/
Reasonable
juror

14

1

3

1

19

Abuse of
discretion

24

4

8

1

37

OVERALL

106

34

24

7

171

Standard of
Review

Table 22: Raw Data—Federal Circuit (Non-Patent Cases Only)
Issues
Aff’d

Issues
Rev’d

Issues
Vacated

Issues
Aff’d in
Part

TOTAL

De novo

55

11

8

1

75

Clear error

6

2

1

1

10

Substantial
evidence/
Reasonable
juror

35

0

3

0

38

Abuse of
discretion

59

3

4

1

67

OVERALL

155

16

16

3

190

Standard of
Review
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Appendix B: Raw Data—Reversal Rates for Several Examples
of Procedural Postures
Tables 23–25 below show the raw data for the cases examined
involving summary judgment, JMOL, and preliminary injunction,
respectively.

Table 23: Raw Data—Summary Judgment
Total Cases
Examined

Affirmed

Reversed

Vacated

Reversed in
Part

Federal
Circuit

40

23

4

2

11

Non-Fed
Circuits
(TOTAL)

355

274

24

21

35

2d Cir.

219

165

11

19

23

5th Cir.

47

41

4

0

2

7th Cir.

44

37

2

1

4

9th Cir.

45

31

7

1

6

Circuit

Table 24: Raw Data—JMOL
Total Cases
Examined

Affirmed

Reversed

Vacated

Reversed in
Part

Federal
Circuit

65

31

14

3

17

Non-Fed
Circuits
(TOTAL)

256

197

34

4

21

2d Cir.

48

38

5

2

3

5th Cir.

99

80

12

1

6

7th Cir.

37

26

7

0

4

9th Cir.

72

53

10

1

8

Circuit
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Table 25: Raw Data—Preliminary Injunction
Total Cases
Examined

Affirmed

Reversed

Vacated

Reversed in
Part

Federal
Circuit

39

20

4

12

3

Non-Fed
Circuits
(TOTAL)

353

231

50

48

24

Circuit

2d Cir.

91

61

9

15

6

5th Cir.

55

34

1

15

5

7th Cir.

42

25

7

9

1

9th Cir.

165

111

33

9

12

